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THE "HIDDEN JUDICIARY":
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
EXECUTIVE BRANCH JUSTICE
CHRIS GUTHRIEt
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKItt
ANDREW J. WISTRICHttt

ABSTRACT

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they
decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we
demonstrate that these executive branchjudges, like their counterparts
in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather
than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new
light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition,
not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing
these importantjudicialofficers.
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INTRODUCTION

Administrative law judges (ALJs) toil in the shadows of the civil
justice system. They work for the executive branches of state and
federal governments, usually embedded in specialized agencies.
Located outside the courtrooms in which generalist judges preside,
they comprise a "hidden judiciary."1
To citizens, however, the 14,100 ALJs2 are anything but hidden.
They "adjudicate massive numbers of individual disputes, far
exceeding the number resolved by courts."3 They handle matters in
many areas of concern to citizens and society, including "disability,
retirement, and other income security entitlements; consumer,
workplace, and environmental safety; labor relations and civil rights
violations; and regulatory programs in industry, commerce,

1. See Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit Process Works in
Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part 1), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 60 (1979) (coining the term
"hidden judiciary"). But see Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 323 (2002) ("We [administrative law judges] used to be
referred to as the hidden judiciary; but you do not see that phraseology much any more.").
2. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, 2007, at 9 tbl.1
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release No. 08-0620, rev. ed. 2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf (reporting that 14,100 "administrative law
judges, adjudicators, and hearing officers" were employed in the United States in 2007).
3. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV.
693. 693 (2005).
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communications, banking, and transportation." 4 At the federal level,
ALJs conduct at least nine times as many trials as federal judges In
short, ALJs are the "face of justice" for most American citizens.'
The prevalence of administrative judging exposes a great irony
concerning ongoing debates about judicial specialization. Scholars,
pundits, and politicians periodically call for greater specialization
among judges,7 typically motivated by concerns that generalist judges
simply cannot master the many complex areas of law and fact
involved in modern litigation. Although the most visible courts are
composed of generalist judges, a surprisingly large percentage of
disputes are adjudicated by specialist judges. The quiet delegation of
judicial authority to administrative tribunals is a long-term trend that
has arisen more out of necessity than out of a careful assessment of
the benefits and costs of judicial specialization. The wisdom of this
trend has received little serious consideration or empirical study.
Using well-established psychological research methods, we seek to
begin to fill that gap in this Article.
Based on previous research involving generalist judges-federal
district judges, state court judges, and federal magistrate judges-we
have developed a model of judicial decisionmaking that explains how
even well-qualified, experienced, and well-intentioned judges can
make erroneous decisions. As we discuss in Part I, we have found that
generalist judges appear to rely too heavily on intuition, rather than
deliberation, when making judgments.' We raise the theoretical
4. Daniel. L. Skoler, The Administrative Law Judiciary: Change, Challenge, and Choices,
462 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 34,36 (1982).
5. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empiricaland Normative
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 799 (2004)
(reporting that while federal judges conducted a total of about 85,000 trials (defined as
"contested hearings at which evidence is presented") during 2001, just four federal
administrative agencies (the SSA, the INS, the Board of Veterans Appeals, and the EEOC)
conducted more than 720,000 trials that year): Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1343 (1992) ("ALJs probably decide more
'cases' each year than do their federal judicial counterparts.").
6. Yoder, supra note 1, at 323.
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227. 1228 (2006) (reviewing the demand for and the
trends toward judicial specialization).
8. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al.,
Blinking] (proposing an intuitive-override model of decisionmaking and presenting relevant
experimental evidence); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind]
(reporting experimental evidence showing that judges are susceptible to misleading heuristics
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possibility in Part II that administrative law judges-who tend to have
greater subject-matter expertise and face more frequent
decisionmaking oversight-might make better decisions than
generalist judges. Part III then describes our empirical study of ALJ
decisionmaking. In it, we attempt to sort out whether ALJs do in fact
make more deliberative decisions than their generalist judge
counterparts. We base our results on two different empirical
investigations. First, as Part III.B explains, we report the results of a
study designed to assess whether ALJs demonstrate a propensity to
engage in impressionistic and intuitive problem solving or
deliberative and reflective problem solving when faced with generic
decision problems. Second, as Part III.C explains, we report the
results of several experiments designed to assess whether ALJs
demonstrate susceptibility or resistance to common "heuristics and
biases" 9 that have been shown to influence judicial decisionmaking.
With regard to both, we find that ALJs, just like generalist judges,
make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative
decisions and are vulnerable to the same types of decisionmaking
errors.
We conclude by arguing that our findings shed new light on
executive branch justice. Among ALJs, executive branch agencies,
and the scholars who study them, judicial independence has
dominated discussion. We argue, instead, that the primary issue of
concern is not judicial independence but judicial intuition.
I. INTUITIVE-OVERRIDE MODEL OF JUDGING

Building on research from psychology as well as our own
previous research on judicial decisionmaking, we contend that
generalist judges approach legal problems using two distinct systems
of judgment.'" On the one hand, judges, like other human beings, use

and biases when making judgments); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153
U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (reporting experimental evidence showing that judges have difficulty
deliberately disregarding relevant but inadmissible evidence when making merits decisions).
9. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (introducing the concept of heuristics and biases).
10. See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 6; Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West,
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421, 436 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) ("Although there are several two-process theories of

HeinOnline -- 58 Duke L.J. 1480 2008-2009

2009]

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W JUDGES

1481

an intuitive system of judgment, which is made up of so-called
"System 1" processes." System 1 processes are "automatic, heuristicbased, and relatively undemanding of computational capacity."' 2 In
short, they are "spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast."' 3 When
assessing legal problems, judges 4 quickly develop an intuition or
"hunch" about the right outcome.'
On the other hand, judges, like other human beings, also use a
deliberative system of judgment, which is made up of so-called
"System 2" processes. 5 System 2 processes require "effort,
motivation, concentration, and the execution of learned rules."' 6 In
short, these processes are "deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and
slow."' 7 This means that when judges confront legal problems, they
are also able to analyze them in a more measured, deliberative, and
rule-based way.
Our intuitive-override model of judging asserts that these two
systems interact in a fairly predictable way. Relying on a generic
model of decisionmaking proposed by Professors Daniel Kahneman
and Shane Frederick, 8 we contend that judges initially make intuitive
or System 1 judgments-which are effortless, fast, and often
accurate-that they might override with deliberative or System 2
processes-which are more time and labor intensive. As Kahneman
and Frederick explain their model, "System 1 quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2
monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse,
correct, or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are

reasoning that differ somewhat in their details, all agree on the general features of the two
systems which, for simplicity, we label System 1 and System 2.").
11. See Stanovich & West, supra note 10, at 436.
12. Id.
13. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 49, 49.
14. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
15. See Stanovich & West, supra note 10, at 436 ("System 2 conjoins the various
characteristics associated with controlled processing.").
16. Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26
(2005).
17. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 49.
18. Id. at 51.
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called intuitive if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without
much modification."' 19
The intuitive-override model means that judges often rely on
simple heuristics, attend closely to various informational cues that can
be misleading, and can be influenced by untoward psychological
phenomena in their decisionmaking. ° But judges can sometimes
override these misleading intuitive responses with a more deductive,
deliberative decisionmaking approach. 2' This combination of intuition
and deliberative override makes judges efficient decisionmakers, but
we have found evidence suggesting that generalist judges may overrely on their intuitive processes and under-use their deliberative
faculties.
We recognize, of course, that the intuitive and deliberative
systems can, and do, interact in a variety of ways.22 We also recognize
that the brain is not neatly divided into two systems-it contains
many areas that seem to perform discrete functions that are all
interconnected. 2 The notion of two systems is perhaps better viewed
as a metaphor, or organizing principle, than a hard-wired reality in
the brain. In the main, however, we think that our proposed model
captures judges' basic approach to decisionmaking and offers a more
realistic, though still tractable, account than those associated with
formalism (that is, purely deductive decisionmaking) and realism
(that is, intuitive rationalization).
II. INTUITION AND DELIBERATION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

Does the same model of judging apply to ALJs? We suspect that
it does. ALJs possess educational and professional credentials
comparable to those of generalist judges, 24 and in the courtroom, they

19. Id.
20. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 33.
21. Id. at 3.
22 Id. at 8-9 (identifying various ways in which intuition and deliberation can interact in
judgment and decisionmaking).
23. See Mark Lubell et al., Institutional Design Capitalizing on the Intuitive Nature of
Decision Making, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS: DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND

413, 414 (Christoph Engel & Wolf Singer eds., 2008) ("[Tjhe
distinction between conscious and unconscious is a somewhat artificial construct. So, too, is the
supposed 'system 1' versus 'system 2' distinction." (citation omitted)).
24. Most AL~s, like most generalist judges, are lawyers, see, e.g., Skoler, supra note 4, at 36
("[Federal] ALs must be lawyers."), but some state ALJs are not, see, e.g., Yoder, supra note 1,
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
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perform the same functions. 25 That is, they "hear cases, find the facts,
and apply the law." 6 But even if the ALJs rely upon the same
combination of intuition and deliberation, several features of the
unique role they play in the legal system might lead them to rely more
heavily than ordinary judges on deliberation. First, because ALJs
tend to specialize, they might develop the expertise to discern when it
is important to override their intuition with deliberation. Second,
because ALJs face greater scrutiny of their decisions than do their
generalist counterparts, they might feel more accountable, and this
accountabilitymight lead to more deliberative decisionmaking. Third,
this heightened scrutiny might give ALJs greater access to feedback,
which might also facilitate more deliberative decisionmaking.27
A.

Expertise

The most striking difference between most ALJs and most
generalist judges is that ALJs almost always specialize." In the federal
government and many state governments, ALJs work for a particular

at 325 ("We come in all shapes and sizes[:] lawyers and non-lawyers, federal and state, central
panels and agency employees.").
25. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) ("There can be little doubt that the role of
the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is
'functionally comparable' to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable
to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the
course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions."); James E. Moliterno, The
Administrative Judiciary'sIndependence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1196-97 (2006)
(observing that ALJs "possess, of course, the fundamental core of the judicial definition, which,
while nowhere given authoritatively, is by wide approval known to consist in the impartial
adjudication of cases").
26. Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary:ALJ's in HistoricalPerspective, 20 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 157 (2000); see also R. Terrence Harders, Striking a
Balance: Administrative Law Judge Independence and Accountability, J.NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES, Spring 1999, at 1, 9 ("[T]hose who come before ALJs recognize that the deciding of
disputes, the prescribing of duties, and the recognition of entitlement affects them in much the
same way that litigation plays out in courts of law.").
27. Although we focus on potential advantages that ALJs possess, we acknowledge that
ALJs might face potential disadvantages as well. For example, ALJs frequently face crowded
dockets and often have fewer resources, such as judicial clerks, than many of their generalist
counterparts. This might make them more, not less, prone to making snap, routinized,
bureaucratic judgments. See Koch, supra note 3, at 693 ("Administrative agencies adjudicate
massive numbers of individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by courts.").
28. We recognize that a meaningful fraction of judicial branch judges serve on specialized
courts, but most judicial branch judges are generalists. See generally CENT. EUROPEAN &
EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE. AM. BAR ASS'N, SPECIALIZED COURTS: A CONCEPT PAPER
(1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing background on the composition of the
U.S. specialized courts).
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agency, like the Social Security Administration or the Department of
Labor. 29 Before ascending to the bench, they often have relevant
expertise and practice experience." Once they become ALJs, their
expertise in the subject matter of the agency deepens because most of
them adjudicate disputes involving only the agency for which they

29. See L. Harold Levinson, The Status of the AdministrativeJudge, 38 AM. J. COMP. LAW
523, 535 (1990) ("Most ALJs specialize in adjudicating cases for only one agency .... "). This is
uniformly true in the federal government because there all federal ALJs are employed by a
particular agency. In the states, the employment arrangements of ALJs are more complicated
and less amenable to "scholarly generalizations." Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:State
Administrative Procedureand Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 553 (2001); see also
Skoler, supra note 4, at 35 ("Writing about administrative law judges at both federal and state
levels is a tricky business and therefore rarely done."). Historically, most state ALJs, like their
federal counterparts, worked for specific agencies. See, e.g., James F. Flanagan, Redefining the
Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (2002) [hereinafter
Flanagan, Redefining the Role] (observing that California created the first central panel in 1945
and that seven states had central panels by 1983). Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, many more
states-now about thirty of them-moved to adopt, in various forms, "central panels" or
independent AU agencies. See, e.g., James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central
Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (2005) [hereinafter
Flanagan, Update on Developments] ("Twenty-five states, and three major cities, have
established central panels thus far."); Rossi, supra, at 568 ("In more than thirty states, to one
degree or another administrative law judges (ALJs) are housed in a central panel .... "); Nat'l
Ass'n of Admin. Law Judiciary, Non-Central Panel States, http://www.naalj.org/nonpanel.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (identifying 29 states with central panels). Professor James Flanagan
describes these central panel arrangements as follows:
A central panel of ALJs is a cadre of professional adjudicators who are
administratively independent of the agencies whose cases they hear, and thus, they
are removed from agency influence. The central panels are organized in several ways.
In some states, the central panel is an independent agency within the executive
branch. In others, the central panel is part of another agency for administrative
support, but independent for all other purposes. A third variation puts the AL~s in a
separate organization, but assigns each ALJ to a particular agency based upon
expertise in the subject matter.
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra, at 1356; see also William R. Andersen, Judicial Review of
State Administrative Action-Designing the Statutory Framework, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 55457 (1992) (proposing three models of administrative adjudication). But see Koch, supra note 3,
at 733 ("[P]anel judges, since they serve many agencies, are generalists and thus do not provide
the expertise and experience inherent in the traditional scheme."). At present , then, all federal
ALJs and nearly half of the state ALJs work within one agency, and among those state ALJs
who are employed by central panels, many of them also specialize in the law and policy of a
particular agency.
30. See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1406 ("States often require ALJs to
have substantive knowledge or experience in the subject matter .. "); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:14F-12(a) (West 2001) (requiring that judges hired into the environmental unit have
"special expertise" in environmental law); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2003.049(d) (Vernon
2000) (requiring ALJs to have experience in utility law).

HeinOnline -- 58 Duke L.J. 1484 2008-2009

2009]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

1485

work, meaning that they hear similar matters over and over again." In
contrast to federal district judges-who at any given time might be
hearing diversity cases involving various states' substantive laws,
multiple criminal matters, and disputes filed under a wide variety of
federal statutes-most ALJs repeatedly hear the same kinds of cases.
We do not want to overstate the difference between ALJs and
generalist judges.32 As our own data show,33 some of the ALJs hear
many different kinds of cases, particularly those who serve on
"central panels." These ALJs may differ little from the trial judges
who sit in their states' court of general jurisdiction. Conversely, in
some jurisdictions, state trial judges specialize, devoting themselves to
particular areas of law such as juvenile or family law. These state
court judges may be no different from many of the ALJs who
specialize in narrow areas of law. Nonetheless, specialization is the
norm among ALJs but the exception among judicial branch trial
judges.
Because ALJs typically develop specialized expertise that their
counterparts in the generalist judiciary do not possess, they might be
better decisionmakers. Specialization does not always improve
decisionmaking, however. Some research shows that greater expertise
facilitates better judgment,34 but other research shows that generalists
are just as competent as specialists.35 In one previous study, we found

31. This is so not only for the obvious reason that ALJs are repeatedly exposed to similar
matters, but also because the agencies that employ them often provide the ALJs with important
guidance to keep them abreast of relevant legal and policy developments. Flanagan, Redefining
the Role, supra note 29, at 1406; see also, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(c) (providing
a specific example requiring the agency to provide a statement on applicable rules and policies).
32. See Edward Cheng, The Myth of the GeneralistJudge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519,540 (2008)
(presenting evidence that generalist appellate judges tend to write opinions in various
specialized areas).
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641-42 (2003) (finding that lawyers were less susceptible than
nonlawyers to the pernicious effects of contrast or asymmetric dominance); Chris Guthrie &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2047
(2006) ("This paper reports the results of several litigation problems-two anchoring problems,
three framing problems, and one self-serving bias problem-involving nearly two hundred
participants from the insurance industry. The results reported in the paper suggest that these
experts, relative to others who have been studied, make decisions that more closely
approximate rational choice."); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX.L. REV. 77, 99-101 (1997) (finding
that lawyers are less susceptible than nonlawyers to framing effects).
35. ScoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258 (1993)
("[Sleveral studies have found that experts display either roughly the same biases as college
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that federal bankruptcy judges appear as susceptible to common
errors in judgment as their generalist counterparts,36 suggesting that
specialization "does not lead inexorably to improved decision
making.

37

Nonetheless,

typical

ALJs,

even

as

compared

to

bankruptcy judges, tend to develop unusually high levels of
specialized expertise and may therefore have much more familiarity
with the matters they encounter in court.
B. Accountability
Even if specialization does not necessarily lead to better
decisionmaking, ALJs might make more rational and deliberative
decisions than their generalist-judge counterparts because they are
more accountablefor their decisions.8 In contrast to generalist judges,
ALJs often do not make "final" decisions; instead, they issue
recommended decisions that are reviewed by their agency heads. 39 As
students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels."); see also, e.g., John C. Anderson, D.
Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects
and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 725-31 (1993) (indicating that auditors,
like nonexperts, are influenced by the hindsight bias); Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the
Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 307 (1988) (demonstrating that psychologists, like
nonexperts, are prone to the hindsight bias); Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About
Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
289, 296-97 (1995) (finding that framing effects similarly influenced lawyer and nonlawyer
subjects); Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferencesfor Alternative Therapies,
306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261-62 (1982) (finding that physicians, like nonexperts, are
susceptible to framing effects); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs,
and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 94-96 (1987) (finding that real
estate agents, like nonexperts, are influenced by anchoring effects when estimating real estate
prices).
36. Rachlinski et al., supra note 7, at 1256 ("With regard to the two phenomena that we
have tested in prior studies of generalist judges-anchoring and framing-the bankruptcy
judges performed much like the generalist judges we have previously studied."); see also
Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptionsof Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 979, 983-85 (1994) (reporting evidence suggesting that bankruptcy judges are susceptible
to self-serving or egocentric biases when making judgments).
37. Rachlinski et al., supra note 7, at 1257.
38. The argument developed here bears some relation to Mark Seidenfeld's argument that
accountability created by the prospect of judicial review might enhance agency decisionmaking.
See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509 (2002) ("Judicial review provides accountability,
within the core psychological concept .. ");see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1061-68 (2001)
(reviewing the psychological research on accountability).
39. According to James Flanagan, "the agency's power to review the findings of the ALJ"
is a "fundamental premise of administrative adjudication." Flanagan, Update on Developments,
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Professor James Moliterno observes, this review can be quite
searching; none of an ALJ's findings, including factual
determinations, are binding on the agency because "[t]he agency is
omnipotent when it comes to administrative judge decisions. 4 0 This

means that ALJs are accountable to a superior-the agency head or
the agency head's designates, like the agency's general counsel's
office-in a way that generalist judges are not. And on top of this,
ALJs' decisions, like the decisions of generalist judges, are also
subject to judicial review in the courts.
The ubiquitous accountability that ALJs face might enhance the
quality of their decisionmaking because research shows that
accountability often leads to better decisionmaking.41 When
supra note 29, at 401; see also James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary'sIndependence
Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1224 (2006) ("[Aidministrative judges are crucially
dependent, both in that their decisions often require executive affirmation and in that they are
always subject to executive review .... ").
This "fundamental premise" is embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act, which
gave rise to the modern ALJ in federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also Flanagan,
Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1364. Moreover, the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act adopted the federal standard in 1981, as did many of the administrative
procedure acts in the states. Id.
In recent years, some states-particularly those that have embraced a "central panel"
system, see supra note 29, have moved to enhance the finality of ALJ decisions, see, e.g.,
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1373 (observing that "[alt the beginning of the
1990s, in almost all the states including those with central panels, the statutes permitted the
agency to amend the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law with relative ease," but
noting that this began to change in the early 1990s); Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal:
Balancing Independence with Accountability, J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, Fall 1999, at 1,
2 ("[F]ollowing the proliferation of central panels, many states have increasingly given AU
orders de jure or de facto finality by taking away an agency's opportunity to review ALJ
decisions or requiring agencies to accept AU findings unless the agency overcomes a fairly
rigorous evidentiary or reasoning burden.").
Despite this innovation in some states, ALJs, even those who preside in central panel
states, are much less independent and much more accountable than their counterparts in the
judicial branch, as Professor James Moliterno explains:
[T]he central fact of review remains: central panel administrative judges' decisions are
also reviewed directly by agencies, often case-party agencies. This is the key fact that
largely deprives administrative judges of the judicial independence trait. In reality,
nothing is fundamentally changed with the institution of the central panel concept.
The administrative judiciary simply becomes a judiciary within the executive
branch/administrative state. This feature may further serve to insulate the
administrative judge in an impartiality sense, but the administrative judge remains a
member of the executive branch, fully subject to override by the agency.
Moliterno, supra, at 1233.
40. Moliterno, supra note 39, at 1225.
41. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 260-62 tbl.1 (1999) (documenting the extensive
literature on accountability).
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decisionmakers know the views of the parties to whom they are
accountable, they generally anticipate and adopt those views." This
suggests that when ALJs know how their agency head would decide
the case before them, they are likely to decide in the manner that they
believe their agency head would decide, hewing closely to the
agency's interpretation of its governing law. When decisionmakers do
not know the views of the parties to whom they are accountable, they
are more likely to engage in "self-critical" and "effortful" processing,
often leading to improved decisionmaking. 3 This suggests that when
ALJs know their decisions will be reviewed, but are uncertain how
their agency head would decide the case, they will exert more effort
and care than is customary, perhaps leading to more rational and
deliberative decisionmaking. In either case, then, there is reason to
believe that ALJs, at least relative to their counterparts in the
judiciary, might make better decisions because they have a higher
degree of accountability."
As with expertise, the apparent difference in accountability
between ALJs and generalist judges is easy to overstate. For example,
both generalist judges and ALJs are similarly accountable in the sense
that both offices tend to carry a high degree of job security. ALJs are
certainly less secure than Federal District Judges, but they are apt to
have more job security than state judges and are likely to have some

42. See, e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 256 ("When audience views are known
prior to forming one's own opinion, conformity becomes the likely coping strategy. People can
simply adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to whom they are accountable, thereby
allowing them to avoid the unnecessary cognitive work of analyzing the pros and cons of
alternative courses of action, interpreting complex patterns of information, and making difficult
trade-offs." (citations omitted)); Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment
and Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADV. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331,
340-41 (1992) (observing that when people know the views of those to whom they are
accountable, they frequently adopt those views).
43. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 259, 260-62 tbl.1 (describing this phenomenon and
identifying the decision heuristics and biases that are attenuated, as well as a small number that
are actually amplified, by this form of accountability); see also Tetlock, supra note 42, at 343
("Predecisional accountability to unknown audiences frequently motivates vigilant, complex,
and self-critical thinking."). For refinements, see Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of
Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN
DECISION PROCESSES 416, 437 (1992). "[A]ccountability is expected to reduce errors if decision
makers can identify the response that would be regarded as more rational, but that response is
different from the one that unaccountable decision makers tend to make." Id.
44. For the argument that any behavioral analysis of legal decisionmaking should consider
the potential impact of accountability on the decisionmaker, see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
EqualIncompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 110-14 (2002).
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measure of civil service protection or the like. Job security is
obviously one important aspect of accountability, but it is not what we
are focusing on here. The psychological evidence on accountability
suggests that scrutiny of individual decisions by superiors, as opposed
to lengthy performance reviews, can reduce reliance on intuitive
judgment. It is in this sense that the ALJs are somewhat more
accountable than generalist trial judges. Many of their decisions are
merely recommendations to agencies, which may or may not be
adopted.45 To be sure, in some cases, these recommendations are
adopted with sufficient frequency that they might as well be final
orders, but even if an ALJ's recommendations as to a final order are
accepted, they are still subject to review by a trial or appellate court,
meaning that ALJs are subject to at least one additional layer of
review that trial judges are not. Therefore, ALJs, particularly those
who issue only recommendations, make decisions that are more apt
to be scrutinized in the way that psychologists contend might reduce
reliance on intuitive processing.'
C. Feedback
The third reason we expected to find that ALJs might make
more rational and deliberative decisions is a consequence of the
second. Because ALJs are subject to review by the agencies that
employ them (as well as by the courts in those cases subject to judicial
review), they receive much more feedback on the accuracy of their

45. For example, ALJs in Oregon might face the same degree of scrutiny as the trial court:
Ninety eight percent of the OAH's orders are final orders. These orders generally
cannot be changed by agencies after ALJs issue them. They are appealable to a
circuit court or the Court of Appeals (unemployment insurance decisions are
appealable to the Employment Appeals Board). The remaining OAH orders are
proposed orders. Proposed orders are decisions recommended to agencies by ALJs
based on their review of the facts and law. Agencies are not required to accept the
recommendations. However, if they do not, they are required to explain the reason
for all "substantial" changes. If findings of fact are changed, they must show how
most of the evidence at hearing supports their version of the facts; on appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the Court can look at the entire record and determine
independently (de novo) whether it agrees with the agency's version.
Office of Admin. Hearings, The OAH, http://www.oregon.gov/OAHITheOAH2.shtml (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009).
46. The fact that some ALJs make only recommended decisions might encourage reliance
on intuitive processes. Knowing that a decision might be reviewed by an agency head could lead
to a diffusion of responsibility so that ALJs worry less about the accuracy of their decisions.
Although this is possible, we doubt it. We suspect that ALJs, like most judges, take their
positions very seriously and use whatever resources and information that they have available to
try to make sound judgments.
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decisions than does a typical judicial-branch judge. In contrast to
generalist judges, who face appellate review in only a very small
number of cases47 and on limited bases,4 ALJs receive review much
more commonly. Some ALJs only make recommendations to
agencies, which might mean that they receive feedback in virtually
every case. In the large majority of cases in which agencies embrace
the ALJs' decisions,49 the ALJs learn that their decisions were
accurate, at least from the perspective of the agency employing
them. 0 And in the cases in which the agency rejects their decisions,
the ALJs receive immediate feedback regarding the flaws in their
decisionmaking, at least from the perspective of the agency.
Furthermore, some agencies conduct routine audits of ALJ decisions,
producing a kind of report card for each judge.5
Psychologists have found that feedback-if it is provided
promptly and offers meaningful insight into the causes and
consequences
of
decisionmaking
flaws-can
improve
decisionmaking s2 This is precisely the kind of feedback that ALJs, in
47. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 8 (1996) ("[O]nly about 20 percent of all district court cases are appealed in
any given year."); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried
Cases: Further Explorationof Anti-PlaintiffAppellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
659, 685 (2004) ("About 20 percent of cases with definitive trial court judgments generate
appeals, with tried cases appealed at about twice the rate of nontried cases.").
48. See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 47, at 9 (observing that interpretations of fact
are free from review); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error,30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 161, 162 (2001); Maurice Rosenberg, Standardsof Review, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE:
THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 30,31

(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining bases of review).
49. See, e.g., Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges,Agencies, and Courts:
An Analytical and EmpiricalAssessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1616 (2001) (reporting, based on
an empirical examination of ALJ decisionmaking in North Carolina, that agencies fully adopted
82 percent and partially adopted 6 percent of the decisions recommended by their ALJs).
50. We do not address the issue of political conflicts between the ALJs and the agency. An
ALJ could interpret the law and facts perfectly well, but face an agency bent on moving the law
in a new direction, or implementing a new policy. Although such conflicts would produce
reversals of the AL they are not really errors.
51. The Social Security Administration, for example, conducts these kinds of audits. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SSA DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: ADDITIONAL STEPS
NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY AND FAIRNESS OF DECISIONS AT THE HEARINGS LEVEL 9
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0414.pdf (describing the SSA's Office of
Quality Assurance and Performance Assessment's process for conducting quality assurance
reviews of a random sample of ALJ decisions). This is similar to the peer review we
recommended in a previous paper. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 39.
52. See, e.g., ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 88-90 (2001) (distinguishing
"kind" environments, which provide valuable feedback and in turn can improve intuitions, from
"wicked" environments, which do not).
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contrast to generalist trial judges, typically receive. The availability of
this kind of feedback thus provides yet another reason to be
optimistic about the quality of ALJ decisionmaking.
To be sure, if the decisions ALJs make are adopted routinely,
they will not receive much better feedback than trial judges. 3 Also,
the feedback that agencies give to ALJs might be unclear or muted.
But the average ALJ will tend to get more feedback from a reviewing
agency (and subsequent judicial review) than the average trial judge
will. Whether such feedback is sufficient to induce ALJs to rely less
on intuition is unclear.
D. Summary
ALJs enjoy some potential advantages over generalist trial
judges that might enable them to make more rational decisions. They
often specialize in limited areas of law, their decisions are more apt to
be scrutinized on review, and they receive more frequent and prompt
feedback. For these three reasons-specialization, accountability, and
feedback-we hypothesized that ALJs might make predominantly
rational and deliberative, rather than predominantly intuitive and
impulsive, decisions.54

III.

STUDYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

We have reported evidence in our prior work that supports our
intuitive-override model of judging.5 That work, however, is based on
53. Adoption rates vary. In Oregon, adoption rates exceed 98 percent in many categories
of cases. See Office of Admin. Hearings, supra note 45. Arizona reports that adoption rates of
A1A decisions are over 85 percent. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2008), available at http://www.azoah.com/l3thAnnualReport.pdf (reporting that the
Arizona agency acceptance of central panel ALJs' findings of fact and conclusions of law
without modification was 92.6 percent, and that the overall rate of adoption of entire ALJ
decisions (that is, including the remedy portion of the recommendation) without modification
was 86.64 percent).
54. We recognize, of course, that some previous empirical studies of ALJs suggest that they
are not ideal decisionmakers. Some ALJs have been shown to produce decisions that vary by
the race of the litigants, see Stephen Labaton, Benefits Are Refused More Often to Disabled
Blacks, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al (summarizing a 1992 study by the General
Accounting Office and reporting that "[f]or 30 years, blacks with serious ailments have been
much more likely than whites to be rejected for benefits under Social Security disability
programs"), and others have been shown to be wildly erratic, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REv. 295, 296 (2007) (reporting "amazing disparities" in asylum grant rates among
immigration judges).
55. See sources cited supra note 8.
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evidence gathered from trial judges who are generalists (and, in one
instance, from a sample of federal bankruptcy judges). The purpose
of this Article is to explore whether this model also captures the way
ALJs appear to make decisions. Because they are similar to generalist
judges in education, experience, and role, it seems likely that ALJs
would behave in much the same way as generalist judges. On the
other hand, as explained above, ALJs might have some
decisionmaking advantages, given their subject-matter expertise,
accountability to agency superiors, and more frequent receipt of
timely feedback.
To explore ALJ decisionmaking, we conducted two lines of
investigation. First, we explored whether ALJs appear more inclined
toward intuition or deliberation when responding to a set of generic
problems that make up the "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT). 6
Second, we asked ALJs to respond to a series of hypothetical,
judicial-decisionmaking problems in which we explored whether
different variables triggered intuitive decisionmaking. In this Part, we
explain our methods and then present our results.
A. Methods
To explore ALJ decisionmaking, we gave questionnaires to two
groups of ALJs attending judicial education conferences at which we
appeared as speakers. The first group, which consisted of thirty-nine
ALJs, attended the City of New York Administrative Judicial
Institute in New York City in June of 2008 (the "city conference").
The second group, which consisted of 103 ALJs, attended the
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 2008 Annual
Conference in New York City in October of 2008 (the "national
conference").
Among the ALJs who attended the city conference, twenty-two
were men and seventeen were women. They had an average of 10.1
years of experience, with a range of zero to twenty-nine years. In
response to a question concerning their affiliation with a political
party, thirty-one identified themselves as Democrats, three as
Republicans, and five declined to answer this question. Among the
ALJs who attended the national conference, forty were men, fiftyseven were women, and six declined to disclose their gender. These
judges had an average of 10.8 years of experience, with a range of

56. See infra Part l.B.
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zero to thirty-one years' experience. They also identified mostly as
Democrats (seventy-six), as opposed to Republicans (eleven),
although sixteen did not respond to this question.
The judges in the study had a vast and varied range of judicial
experience and expertise. We asked the judges to identify "what type
of cases you normally hear." The ALJs who attended the city
conference gave the following responses: employee discipline,
including police matters (nine judges); administrative code violations
(six judges); environmental control (five judges); health, safety,
building code (five judges), special education (five judges); traffic and
parking (four judges); vehicle forfeiture (four judges); discrimination
claims (two judges); Section 8 (housing) claims (two judges); taxi and
limousine commission (two judges); and one judge each in contract
cases, licensing, sanitation, tax, department of transportation (which
might have been taxi and limo), and zoning.57
The ALJs who attended the national conference included an
even more diverse array of judges. These judges traveled to the
conference from fourteen states: New York (forty-seven judges);
District of Columbia (nine judges); California (four judges); Georgia
(seven judges); Illinois (two judges); Iowa (two judges); Kentucky
(one judge); Maryland (five judges); North Carolina (two judges);
South Carolina (one judge); Texas (two judges); Vermont (one
judge); Washington (two judges); West Virginia (two judges). In
addition, we had two ALJs from Quebec and one federal magistrate
judge. These ALJs reported presiding over a wide range of cases as
well: employment, including unemployment insurance (seven judges);
professional licensing (seven judges); worker's compensation (seven
judges); special education (six judges); housing (section 8 and rent
control) (six judges); environmental (six judges); traffic (including
parking and DUI) (five judges); antidiscrimination (or human rights)
(four judges); health code (four judges); medical/healthcare
(including Medicare) (four judges); consumer protection (four
judges); public works (three judges); building permits (two judges);
labor standards (two judges); child abuse/foster care (two judges);
campaign finance (two judges); parole violations (two judges);
disability (two judges); and one judge each in insurance, immigration,
tax, liquor, securities, forfeiture, and taxi and limousine. Additionally,
twenty-one judges indicated that they were part of the state's "central
57. Note that some of the judges identified more than one type of case in response to this
question.
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panel" and hence were available for all kinds of cases. Another
eleven did not respond to this question.
We also asked this group of judges to identify how their decisions
are reviewed. Specifically, we asked whether they make
"recommendations that are either adopted, rejected, or modified by
an agency" or whether their decisions are simply subject to review by
an agency or a court. Of the ninety-four judges who answered the
question, 44.7 percent (forty-two judges) indicated that they make
recommendations, 39.3 percent (thirty-seven judges) indicated that
they make decisions that are subject to review by an agency, and 51.1
percent (forty-eight judges) reported making decisions that are
subject to review by a court. As the numbers indicate, some of the
judges checked more than one box: two checked both
recommendation and review by agency; three checked
recommendation and review by court; eight checked both review by
agency and review by court; and ten checked all three. To facilitate
some of our analyses, we divide the judges into the 44.7 percent who
indicated that they make recommendations in at least some instances
and the 55.3 percent who are only subject to review by either an
agency or a court. 8
We followed the same procedure at both conferences. Before
beginning our formal presentation, we randomly distributed
questionnaires to the ALJs in person. We asked the ALJs to read and
respond to each of the questions and to provide some basic
demographic information. All of the questionnaires included the
CRT as well as a variety of problems designed to test judicial
decisionmaking 9 We informed the ALJs that participation was
entirely voluntary, that they could continue or cease participating at
any time, and that their responses would be anonymous. We also gave
the ALJs at each conference the opportunity to limit our use of their
results to the conference itself. None of the ALJs at the city
conference did this, but four of the judges at the national conference
exercised this option, and their results are excluded from our analysis.

58. We do not have this data available for the city conference judges (although most are in
the third category), so we do not categorize them in this way or include them in specialized
analyses that distinguish the ALJs from one another based on the type of review to which their
decisions are (or are not) subjected.
59. Copies of the original versions of these problems are included in Appendices A and B,
along with a copy of the questions that elicited demographic information about the judges.
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B. Results: Cognitive Reflection
We first explored whether ALJs, like generalist trial judges, solve
generic problems in an intuitive or deliberative way. To do so, we
gave the ALJs the CRT.6
1. Cognitive Reflection Test. Created by Frederick, the CRT is a
simple, three-item test designed to distinguish intuitive and
impressionistic processing from deliberative and deductive
processing.61 More specifically, the CRT measures "cognitive
reflection," which is "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the
response that first comes to mind."62
The CRT is printed below, as Figure 1. Each of the three CRT
items has an intuitive answer that almost immediately comes to mind,
but the intuitive answer is wrong. The correct answer is fairly easy to
determine, but ascertaining it requires deliberation. As Frederick
explains, the CRT items are simple because "their solution is easily
underst[andable] when explained, yet reaching the correct answer
often requires the suppression
of an erroneous answer that springs
63
'impulsively' to mind.,
Figure1. Cognitive Reflection Test64
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
-cents
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
-minutes
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
__day

By way of illustration, consider the "bat-and-ball" problem,
which is the first problem in Figure 1. When asked to solve this
problem, most people immediately report "ten cents" as their

60. Frederick, supra note 16, at 26-28.
61.

Id. at 27.

62. Id. at 35.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Researchers utilized the same three questions in Frederick's study. Id.
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answer.65 Although this response is intuitive, and although it seems as
though it must be correct, a little deliberation reveals that it is
inaccurate. If the ball costs ten cents, as most people think when they
first encounter the problem, and the bat costs one dollar more, as the
problem specifies, the bat must cost $1.10. This means that the total
cost of the bat and ball is $1.20 rather than $1.10 as specified by the
problem. The correct answer is five cents-that is, the ball costs five
cents, the bat costs $1.00 more or $1.05, and the two together cost
$1.10, as required by the problem. It is an easy problem, but to get the
right answer, respondents have to ignore the initial, intuitive,
incorrect answer that occurs to them and think through the problem
in a deliberative way.
This is true for the second CRT problem-the "widget"
problem-as well. On this problem, the answer that comes
immediately to mind for most people is one hundred minutes.6 The
correct answer, however, is five minutes. If, as the problem specifies,
five machines make five widgets in five minutes, it takes each
machine five minutes to make a widget. Thus, one hundred machines
would make one hundred widgets in five minutes (and five hundred
machines would make five hundred widgets in five minutes, one
thousand machines
would make one thousand widgets in five
67
minutes, etc.).
The third problem-the "lily-pad" problem-also invites an
intuitive and inaccurate response. For most people, the answer that
immediately comes to mind is twenty-four days.68 The correct answer
on this problem, as on the others, is obvious upon reflection. If, as the
problem specifies, the patch of lily pads doubles each day and covers
the entire lake on the forty-eighth day, it must cover half of the lake a
day earlier. This means that the correct answer is forty-seven days,
not twenty-four days.
For those who suppress their impulsive responses and deliberate,
the CRT items are simple and straightforward. Most people are
unable, or perhaps unwilling, to overcome their impulsive reactions to
the problems. In thirty-five studies involving thousands of

65. Id. at 26-27.
66. Id. at 27.
67. As we have noted elsewhere, see Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 11 n.57, this
problem assumes that each machine produces widgets at the same rate, which seems a
reasonable assumption given the structure of the problem and of the CRT as a whole.
68. Frederick, supra note 16, at 27.
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respondents, Frederick found that subjects correctly answered, on
average, only 1.24 of the three items.69 Among all of the participants
in Frederick's studies, only 17 percent answered all three questions
correctly; roughly twice that many (33 percent) got all three problems
70
wrong.
The CRT illustrates the predominance of intuitive over
deliberative processing in three ways. First, most people perform
poorly on the CRT, even though the problems are simple if
approached deliberatively' Ironically, people tend to perform better
on similar but harder problems that signal that deliberation is
required.72 Frederick explains, for example, that people "miss the 'bat
and ball' problem far more often than they miss the 'banana and
bagel' problem: 'A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents. The banana73
costs 13 cents more than the bagel. How much does the bagel cost?"'
Second, among the infinite number of potential inaccurate
responses to each of the CRT problems, the intuitive answers
identified above-ten cents in the bat-and-ball problem, one hundred
minutes in the widget problem, and twenty-four days on the lily-pad
problem-are the most commonly offered responses.74
Third, and perhaps most impressively, subjects who select the
inaccurate, intuitive response are more likely than subjects who
answer the problems correctly to indicate that the problems are
easy. 75 In his administration of the bat-and-ball problem, for example,
Frederick found that subjects who provided the intuitive, but
inaccurate, response-that is, ten cents-predicted that 92 percent of
people would solve the problem correctly because it seemed quite
easy to them. Among the subjects who actually provided the correct
answer, however, only 62 percent predicted that other people would
solve the problem correctly.7 ' Having suppressed their intuitive

69. Id. at 28, 29 tbl.1.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 27.
72. Id. at 28.
73. Id. In contrast to the bat-and-ball problem, the banana-and-bagel problem does not
suggest an intuitive response. Accordingly, most people attempt to solve the problem
deliberatively by explicitly or implicitly using algebra-i.e., x = bagel, y = banana, y = x + 13, so
x + x + 13 = 37. Solving for x, x = 12 and y = 25.
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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reaction in favor of deliberation, they appreciated that the problem,
though simple if one deliberated, was actually tricky.
Although the CRT correlates with standard assessments of
intelligence," it does measure what an IQ test measures. Rather, it
tests a respondent's ability to suppress intuition in favor of
deliberation in a setting where intuition is misleading. 8 This is why we
find it to be of interest for judges, who must commonly suppress their
intuition in favor of following a deliberative decisionmaking process.
Furthermore, people who score well on the CRT also appear to resist
falling prey to a range of common cognitive errors in judgment,
including the conjunction fallacy, imperfect Bayesian reasoning,
overconfidence, hyperbolic discounting, and risk preferences resulting
from framing effects. 9 Many of these errors can influence judgments
in legal contexts, and we have found that generalist judges are
vulnerable to some of them. The CRT might be able to identify
judges who suppress the intuitive processes that can produce these
errors and rely instead on deliberative processes.
2. CRT and ALJs. Curious about how generalist judges would
respond to the cognitive reflection test, we gave it to nearly half of the
sitting trial judges in Florida at a judicial education conference. The
judges obtained an average score of 1.23, 8° slightly higher than the
average score of students at the University of Michigan (1.18) and
slightly lower than the average score of students at Harvard (1.43).1
Like other subjects, the generalist judges tended to select the
intuitive, but incorrect, answer on the problems,8 and like other
subjects, the judges who did so tended to think that the problems
were easier
than did those judges who answered the problems
83
correctly.
The results seem predictable-judges performed about as well as
the most educated adults on the CRT. The results were not
foreordained, however. Judges spend an enormous amount of time

77. Id. at 35.
78. Id.
79. Jorg Oechssler, Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, Cognitive Abilities and
BehavioralBiases 4-6 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3481, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294555.
80. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 14.
81. Frederick, supra note 16, at 29 tbl.1.
82. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 16.
83. Id.
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sorting through and applying rules that might conflict with their
intuitive responses. As Table 1 indicates, undergraduates at MIT, who
largely specialize in math, engineering, and science, perform much
better on the CRT. The sense that intuition should be ignored, or at
least checked by logic or computation, is well developed in such
professions, and it shows on the CRT results. And that is all to the
good. No one wants to drive over a bridge that was designed by a civil
engineer who relied on intuition as to whether it had enough
structural support; we want someone who did the math. Similarly, we
might want judges who have habits of mind that lead them to check
their intuitive responses with deliberation, but this is not what we
found among generalist judges on the CRT.
ALJs might be different, as we have discussed. To see how the
ALJs would perform on the CRT, we gave the CRT to both samples
of ALJs. We excluded the three judges from the city conference and
the thirteen judges from the national conference who did not
complete all three questions." Among the remaining judges, the city
conference attendees obtained an average score of 1.50, and the ALJs
at the national conference obtained an average score of 1.27.85
Collectively, the ALJs obtained an average score of 1.33, which is
roughly comparable to the score obtained by the Florida state trial
judges.86 Overall, 30.2 percent provided incorrect answers on all three
items; 27.8 percent answered one item correctly; 20.6 percent
answered two items correctly; and 21.4 percent got all answered all
three items correctly. Among those who provided inaccurate
responses, the most commonly offered responses on the CRT
problems were the intuitive but inaccurate responses suggested by the
problem. On the bat-and-ball problem, for example, 93.7 percent of
84. Among these sixteen judges, five answered none of the questions; four answered both
of the first two questions with the intuitive (but wrong) answer, and did not answer the third
question; one answered the first question with the correct answer, the second question with the
intuitive (but wrong) answer, and did not answer the third question; one answered the first
question with the intuitive (but wrong) answer and did not respond to the second or third
questions; one answered the first question with the intuitive answer and the second question with
a wrong (but not the intuitive) answer, and did not respond to the third question; one answered
the first question with the intuitive but incorrect answer, the second question with the correct
answer, and did not respond to the third question; three answered the first question with the
intuitive (but wrong) answer, skipped the second question, and answered the third question with
the correct answer.
85. An ordered logit regression revealed that the two groups did not differ significantly.
z = 1.08rp = .28.
86. An ordered logit regression revealed that the ALJs did not perform significantly
differently than the Florida trial judges. z = .80, p = .45.
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those who responded inaccurately gave the intuitive response
suggested by that problem; on the widget problem, 52.7 percent of
those who got the question wrong gave the intuitive but inaccurate
response; and on the lily-pad problem, 64.9 percent of those who got
the question wrong gave the intuitive but inaccurate response. As
depicted in Table 1, the ALJs performed much like trial judges and
many college students.
Table 1. Overall CRT Results: Judges and Selected Others87
Subject Population
Sample Size)
MIT (61)

(and

Mean
2.18

Percent
0 Right
7

Percent
1 Right
16

Percent
2 Right
30

Percent
3 Right
48

Carnegie Mellon (746)
Harvard (51)

1.51
1.43

25
20

25
37

25
24

25
20

ALAs (126)

1.33

30

28

21

21

Florida Judges (252)

1.23

31

31

24

15

Michigan/Ann Arbor (525)

1.18

31

33

23

14

Bowling Green (52)

.87

50

25

21

6

Michigan State (118)

.79

49

29

16

6

Toledo (138)

.57

64

121

10

5

The ALJs, like the other respondents, provided predominantly
intuitive responses to the CRT items, though most of them
demonstrated that they could override their intuition in at least some
circumstances. Nonetheless, the CRT results show that ALJs, like
generalist judges, gravitate toward intuitive rather than deliberative
processing.'

87. All of the nonjudge data on this table were collected on college students, and comes
from Frederick, supra note 16, at 29 tbl.1. The data from the Florida Judges come from Guthrie
et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 15 tbl.2. Note that the table in our previous article mistakenly
reports the sample size as 192 rather than 252.
88. Previous research with other populations shows that men perform slightly better than
women on the CRT. Frederick, supra note 16, at 37-38, 38 tbl.6 (showing male subjects with a
mean sore of 1.47 and female subjects with a mean score of 1.08). We did not find this to be the
case with the Florida trial judges in our previous work, but we did see differences among the
ALJs. The fifty-eight male judges who both completed the CRT and identified their gender
scored an average of 1.52, whereas the sixty-six women judges scored an average of 1.17. This
difference was marginally significant, per an ordered logit regression, revealing z =1.80, p=.0 7 .
The average CRT scores among the thirty-seven judges in the national conference sample
who make recommendations and completed the CRT was 1.30, as compared to 1.20 among the
forty-nine judges who are only subject to review; this was not a significant difference. The
analysis was done with an ordered logit regression, revealing z =.37, p=.72. This last result is
perhaps no surprise, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that judges who make
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C. Results: JudicialDecisionmaking
The CRT results suggest that ALJs, like their colleagues on
generalist courts, tend to make ordinary judgments in a
predominantly intuitive way. Although suggestive, these results do
not necessarily reveal how ALJs make judgments on the bench. To
explore whether ALJs make intuitive judgments not only when faced
with mathematically oriented word problems, but also when
confronted with the kinds of judgment tasks they face on the job, we
gave the ALJs who participated in our studies several judicialdecisionmaking problems. More specifically, we tested for
susceptibility to six well-known psychological phenomena that are
likely to trigger intuitive thinking: anchoring, framing, conjunction
fallacy, outcome bias, disregarding, and egocentric bias. We found
that ALJs, like generalist judges, are often, though not always,
influenced by these phenomena. Our results support our conclusion
that ALJs, like generalist trial judges, approach legal problems in a
predominantly intuitive, though occasionally deliberative, way.
1. Anchoring. When people make numerical estimates, they tend
to rely heavily on the first number available to them. The initial
number, in other words, provides an "anchor" that exerts
disproportionate influence on the estimation process."' Psychologists
have found, for example, that subjects provided higher estimates of
the average temperature in San Francisco if first asked to indicate
whether it was higher or lower than 558 degrees, and provided higher
estimates of the average price of a college textbook if first asked
whether the average price was higher or lower than $7,128.53. 90
Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as "anchoring."9
Anchoring may be ameliorated by accountability. In research on
anchoring, psychologist Phil Tetlock has found that anchoring has less
influence on people when they learn they must explain their estimates
and that their explanations will be held up for public scrutiny. 92 This
recommendations develop radically different habits of mind that lead them to engage in
deliberative thinking across the board.
89. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 1128 ("[D]ifferent starting points yield
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.").
90. PLOUS, supra note 35, at 146 (reporting the results of an unpublished study conducted
by George Quattrone and his colleagues).
91. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 1128 (introducing the phenomenon).
92. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 262-63 ("Moreover, two especially pervasive
tendencies, (a) anchoring on an initial value and insufficiently adjusting a numerical estimate up
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manipulation mimics the conditions under which judges sometimes
operate, yet we have found that anchors influence the judgments of
generalist trial judges in legal settings. 93 Specifically, we have found
that anchors influence estimates of damage awards by trial judges.94
We have found this effect even when the anchors were clearly
irrelevant and clearly inadmissible.9 5 Because ALJs are accustomed to
review, and because their decisions are commonly afforded less
deference than those of trial judges, they might be less susceptible to
anchoring than their counterparts in the judicial branch.
To explore whether anchoring influences ALJs, we gave the
ALJs who attended the national conference a problem we called
"Veronica v. AAC." We asked the ALJs participating in our study to
imagine that they were presiding over an employment discrimination
case brought by the City Commission on Human Rights on behalf of
Veronica Sanchez against a company called Administrative Assistants
on Call (AAC). In the suit, the ALJs learn, the Commission alleges
that AAC violated the administrative code by terminating Veronica,
a Mexican-American immigrant, on the basis of her "actual or
perceived" race, color, national origin, and citizenship status.
Veronica had been a top employee at AAC, a company that
provides off-site secretarial services to small businesses, until a new
manager arrived. The new manager allegedly assigned her solely to
undesirable projects; used racially offensive terms in her presence;
told her to "go back to Mexico"; and accused her of stealing work
from "real Americans." On one occasion, he made these comments in
front of Veronica's daughter, who was visiting her at work, and in
front of one of Veronica's coworkers, who corroborated Veronica's
testimony. Veronica complained, and the manager proceeded to fire
her.
AAC does not deny Veronica's allegations, but it challenges the
Commission's request for compensatory damages on Veronica's
behalf because Veronica found comparable work immediately after
her termination and because AAC terminated the manager's
employment.

or down from that anchor and (b) weighting sunk costs when considering future investments are
also reduced by accountability." (citations omitted)).
93. See Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 787-92; Wistrich et al., supra note 8,
at 1286-91.
94. Guthrie et al., supra note 8, at 791-92.
95. Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1288-91.
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The ALJs learn that the administrative code authorizes them to
award compensatory damages for "mental anguish." They also learn
that controlling case law provides that such an award is justified when
"there is credible testimony of some degree of emotional distress." In
this instance, we informed the ALJs that Veronica provided credible
testimony that she has suffered from "anxiety, sleeplessness, and bad
dreams." We also informed the ALJs that Veronica mentioned, as an
aside, that she recently saw a court TV show featuring a case she
claimed was similar to hers.
Unbeknownst to the ALJs, we assigned roughly half of them to a
control group and half to an anchor group. The ALJs in the control
group learn that the claimant in the court TV show Veronica watched
received a compensatory damage award, but no dollar amount was
specified. The ALJs assigned to the anchor group learn that Veronica
mentioned that the claimant in the court TV show had received a
compensatory damage award in the amount of $415,300. We then
asked the ALJs in both groups to indicate the amount of
compensatory damages they would award Veronica for her mental
anguish. The anchor in this instance-an alleged award observed on a
court TV show-was irrelevant to the ALJs' determination under the
law.
Furthermore, we directly tested whether accountability might
influence the ALJs' judgments by attempting to replicate Tetlock's
finding that making people explain their decisions would reduce or
eliminate the anchoring effect. We informed roughly half of the
judges that further review of their award was "extremely unlikely."
Judges in these conditions were simply told to assign an award. We
informed the other judges that review of their award and their
explanation was very likely. These judges were asked both to assign
an award and to provide an explanation for the award.
The judges thus evaluated one of four different versions of the
problem: (1) no anchor and no explanation required; (2) no anchor
and an explanation required; (3) anchor and no explanation required;
and (4) anchor and an explanation required.96
96. Although we were concerned that the request for an explanation might have induced
some judges not to answer the question, this does not appear to have been the case. Twenty-one
judges did not respond to this question: seven in the control, no-explanation condition; four in
the control, explanation condition; four in the anchor, no-explanation condition; and six in the
anchor and explanation condition. Among the forty-three judges who provided an award in the
explanation conditions, four did not provide an explanation (one in the control condition and
three in the anchor condition). These judges were nevertheless kept in the analysis.
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The anchor affected the ALJs' judgment. The judges in the
control awarded an average amount of $35,488; the judges in the
anchor group awarded a much larger $58,775 on average. The
averages are a bit misleading because the distribution of damage
awards in both conditions was highly positively skewed, but as Table
2a shows, the anchor shifted the entire distribution of awards upward.
A sizeable number of judges thought that no damage award was
appropriate, even though we had indicated that the employer was
only contesting the "request for damages." In the control condition,
28.6 percent (twelve out of forty-two) of the judges provided an
award of $0, whereas only 7.5 percent (three out of forty) did so in the
anchor condition.
Table 2a. Damage Awards by Condition in the Anchoring Problem
Condition (and
sample size)

Average
Award ($)

Percent
$0 Award

No Anchor
(42)

35,488

28.6

Anchor (40)

58,775

7.5

25th
Percentile

Median

75th
Percentile

0

6,250

10,000

5,000

50,000

100,000

Accountability did not affect judgment by itself. The judges who
were not asked to provide an explanation gave an average award of
$66,308, whereas the judges who were asked to provide an
explanation gave an average damage award of $29,198. On the face of
it, it seems that the explanation requirement reduced awards
substantially. But as Table 2b shows, the explanation did not have
much effect on the overall range of awards, suggesting that the
differences in the averages are the result of a few extremely high
awards in the no-explanation condition. In fact, the no-explanation
condition included a $400,000 award and a $1,000,000 award, whereas
the highest award in the explanation condition was a $200,000
award. 97 Also, in the no-explanation condition, 12.8 percent (five out
of thirty-nine) of the judges provided an award of $0; in the
explanation condition, by contrast, 23.3 percent (ten out of fortythree) did so.

97. The $1,000,000 award was in the no anchor condition. The five next highest awards
were in the anchor condition.
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Table 2b. Damage Awards by Explanationin the Anchorin Problem
Condition

Average

Percent

25th

Median

75th

(and sample size)

Award ($)

$0 Award

Percentile

No Explanation (39)

66,308

12.8

5,000

10,000

50,000

Explanation (43)

29,198

23.3

2,000

10,000

50,000

Percentile

Even though the explanation had no effect on its own, we were
primarily interested in whether requiring an explanation would
ameliorate the effect of the anchor. Thus, we assessed the interaction
between the anchor and the explanation. Table 2c reports these
results. As the sample sizes get small, the results become somewhat
erratic. But a comparison of the anchor and control conditions, both
with and without explanations, suggests that the anchoring effect is
robust; requiring an explanation did not diminish its power much, if at
all. The magnitude of the anchoring effect, as measured by the
difference between the averages in the anchor and control conditions
is roughly $11,000 in the no-explanation condition. The anchoring
effect is higher still-$31,000-when an explanation was required, but
this was due largely to the presence of an award of $1,000,000 in the
control, no-explanation condition. The differences between the
medians and percentiles in the anchor and control conditions provide
a more reliable measure of the anchoring effect. Comparing those
differences shows that both with and without explanation, the anchor
shifted the awards upward throughout the full range.
Table 2c. DamageAwards by Explanation in the Anchoring Problem
Condition (and sample size)

Average

Percent

25th

Award ($)

$0 Award

Percentile

Median

75th
Percentile

No

Control (19)

60,789

21.5

500

7,500

10,000

Explanation

Anchor (20)

71,550

5.0

6500

50,000

100,000

Explanation

Control (23)

14,586

34.8

0

5,000

10,000

Anchor (20)

46,000

10.0

5000

37,500

75,000

Because the distribution of the awards was highly skewed,
assessing the results with statistical tests first required transforming
the data. We took the square root of the award to produce data that
more closely approximated a normal distribution and subjected the
transformed data to a 2x2 ANOVA. The results showed that the
anchor had a significant effect, 9 but neither the explanation, nor the

98.

F(1, 78) = 8.44, p < .005.
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interaction of explanation with the anchor, affected the awards
significantly.9
2. Framing and Fairness.

When people evaluate numeric

options, they tend to code or "frame" them as either gains or losses.1"
Because the very same options can often be presented as either gains

or losses, and because most people find losses much more
unattractive than they find gains attractive, the framing of a problem

can lead to impressionistic and irrational judgments.' 1
Framing can influence a wide range of judgments. In one study
of the framing phenomenon, for example, Professors Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler gave one group of
subjects a "loss" version of a problem and gave another group of
subjects a "gain" version of the same problem.i 2 In the "loss" version,
the subjects learn that:
A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community
experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment but no
inflation. There are many workers anxious to work at the company.
The company
decides to decrease wages and salaries 7 percent this
103
year.
In the "gain" version, the subjects learn that:
99. F(1, 78) = 1.65, p = .20, F(1, 78) = .01, p > .90, respectively for the effect of the
accountability manipulation and the interaction of this variable with the anchoring condition.
Further analysis of the judges' gender, years of experience, and whether they make
recommendations showed that these variables did not affect the judges' awards. For gender and
recommendation, this was done using a 2x2x2 ANOVA on anchor condition, explanation
condition, and gender; all Fs involving gender < 1.4, p's > .20; all F's involving recommendation
< 1.5, p's > .20. Experience was tested with ANCOVA, using experience as a continuous
variable; all Fs involving experience and its interactions < 1.10, p's > .25. The judge's CRT score
likewise had no effect. CRT score was tested with ANCOVA, using CRT score as a continuous
variable; all F's involving CRT score and its interactions < .15,p's > .70. This last result was not
entirely a surprise, as other researchers have found that scores on the CRT do not correlate with
the anchoring effect. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 6 ("Furthermore, the effect of anchoring
is not diminished by cognitive ability. In fact, if anything, the High CRT group seems to be more
susceptible to anchoring, although this effect is not significant.").
100. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984) ("[T]he psychophysical analysis of outcomes should be applied
to gains and losses rather than to total assets.").
101. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986) ("These
characteristics of evaluation make preferences vulnerable to framing effects, in which
inconsequential variations in the presentation of a choice problem affect the decision.").
102. Id.
103. Id.
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[A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community
experiencing a recession with] substantial unemployment and
inflation of 12%. [There are many workers anxious to work at the
company.] The company decides to increase salaries only 5% this

year.
The researchers asked both groups of subjects to evaluate the
fairness of the company's conduct. In both versions of the problem,
the employees end up in exactly the same position; that is, the effect
of the company's wage decision is to leave employees 7 percent worse
off than before. Despite the economic equivalence of the two options,
however, the subjects responded quite differently to the two
situations: 62 percent of subjects thought the 7 percent wage
reduction in a no-inflation environment was unfair, but only 22
percent of the subjects in the 5 percent wage increase in a 12 percent
inflation environment felt the same way. 15 Although multiple
interpretations of these results are possible, the most persuasive is
that the subjects reacted to the framing of the problem. The subjects
interpreted the 7 percent wage reduction as a loss, but interpreted the
5 percent pay raise in a 12 percent inflation environment as a gain. As
the researchers explained, "A wage cut is coded as a loss and
consequently judged unfair. A nominal raise which does not
compensate for inflation is more acceptable because it is coded as a
gain to the employee, relative to the reference wage.'1'

In our previous work, we have found some evidence that framing
can influence generalist judges when they evaluate settlement
offers."' To explore whether framing might influence ALJs on the
job, we gave the ALJs who attended the city conference a problem
similar to the wage problem described above. Building on the realworld observation that companies (for example, gas stations)
frequently offer cash discounts (which are viewed as a prospective
gain to the consumer) but seldom impose credit card surcharges
(which are viewed as a prospective loss to the consumer), we gave the
ALJs a problem called the "Nonpayment Case." Some of the ALJs
received a "loss" version of our problem:

104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 731-32.
107. See Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 794-97 (describing how
"categorization, or 'framing,' of decision options influences the way people evaluate options and
affects their willingness to incur risk" in the context of litigation).
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Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent.
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is $2,000, but
the landlord imposes a $50 per month surcharge if the tenant
chooses to pay by credit card.

We gave the other ALJs a "gain" version of the same problem:
Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent.
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is $2,100, but
the landlord offers a $50 per month discount if the tenant chooses to
pay by check or cash.

We asked the ALJs in both groups to evaluate the fairness of the
landlord's conduct as "completely fair," "acceptable," "unfair," or
"very unfair." In both instances, the tenant will pay the same
amount-$2,050-if she chooses the special payment option made
available by the landlord.
Despite the economic equivalence of outcomes, however, the
ALJs reacted quite differently to the two versions of this problem, as
Table 3 shows. Of the seventeen ALJs who evaluated the fairness of
the credit card surcharge, 47.1 percent found the landlord's behavior
unfair. Of the twenty-one ALJs who evaluated the fairness of the cash
discount, however, a mere 4.8 percent found the landlord's behavior
unfair. The framing of the problem had a significant impact on the
way the ALJs evaluated it."

108. Ordered logit regression showed that the effect of framing was significant. z = 2.87, p <
.005. Further analysis of the judges' gender and years of experience, also using ordered logit
regressions, showed that neither the main effect of variables nor their interaction with frame
affected the judges' ratings. For gender, z's < 1.62, p's > .10; for experience, z's < .65, p's > .50.
The judges' CRT scores likewise did not affect the results. z's < 1.10, p's > .25. Although
framing effects have been found to correlate with CRT scores in other contexts, the type of
framing effect we studied here has not. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 4 ("For both items
[coded as gains and losses], the High CRT group is more likely to choose the alternative that is
compatible with risk neutrality."). That is, the framing of an option as a gain or a loss influences
people's willingness to undertake risk and the framing influences how much importance people
attach to gains and losses; the former, but not the latter, appears to be related to the cognitive
abilities that the CRT is measuring.
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Table 3. Evaluationsof Fairnessof Rent Payment
Condition
(and sample size)

Percent who gave each evaluation (and n)
Unfair
Completely
Acceptable
Fair

Gains/Discount (21)
Losses/Surcharge (17)

29% (6)
6% (1)

67% (14)
47% (8)

5% (1)
41% (7)

Very
Unfair
0%
6% (1)

3. Conjunction. The so-called "extension rule" 10 is "perhaps the
simplest and most transparent rule of probability theory." "0 This rule
states that "if A is a subset of B, then the probability of A cannot
exceed that of B."". For example, the probability of a terrorist act in
New York City (A) cannot exceed the probability of a terrorist act in
the United States (B) because the United States includes New York
City (as well as many other locations that might be subjected to such
an attack). Implicit in the extension rule is the "conjunction rule." '
This rule states that "the probability of A&B can exceed the
probability of neither A nor B, since it is contained in both."".3 For
example, the probability of a terrorist attack in New York City
carried out by Muslim extremists (A&B) cannot exceed the
probability of a terrorist attack in New York City (A) or the
probability of a terrorist act carried out by Muslim extremists (B).
The extension and conjunction rules are deductively accurate, as
only a little deliberation shows. Psychologists have found repeatedly,
however, that people tend to violate these rules of logic. Rather than
engaging in careful deliberation, which leads to compliance with the
rule, people often engage in intuitive, impressionistic thinking and
thereby violate the rules. To many, it seems more likely that New
York City might face a terrorist act committed by Muslim extremists
than that New York City might face a terrorist attack.
109. Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, How Alike Is It Versus How Likely Is It: A Disjunction
Fallacy in ProbabilityJudgments, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1119, 1119 (1993); see
also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 293-94 (1983)
("[Pirobability theory does not determine the probabilities of uncertain events-it merely
imposes constraints on the relations among them. For example, if A is more probable than B,
then the complement of A must be less probable than the complement of B.").
110. Researchers have described this as "perhaps the simplest and most transparent rule of
probability theory," Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 109, at 1130, which "even untrained and
unsophisticated people accept and endorse," id.
111. Id. at 1119.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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The most famous problem of this type-the "Linda
Problem"" 4-is instructive. In this widely administered problem,
Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman gave subjects the
following information about Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and 5social justice, and also participated in
anti-nuclear demonstrations.1
The researchers asked the subjects to rank-order the likelihood
of eight different statements, including these three: "Linda is active in
the feminist movement"; "Linda is a bank teller"; and "Linda is a
bank teller and is active in the feminist movement."" 6 The description
made it seem as though Linda was a feminist, but not a bank teller.
As a result, subjects generally reported that it was more likely that
Linda was a bank teller active in the feminist movement than that she
was a bank teller."' This is wrong. Under the conjunction rule, it
cannot possibly be the case that it is more likely that Linda is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement than that she is simply a
bank teller."'
To explore whether ALJs would comply with, or violate, the
conjunction rule, we gave those who attended the national conference
a problem called the "Employment Case." We asked the ALJs to
imagine that they were presiding in a case involving an employment
dispute between Dina El Saba, a public sector employee, and the
agency for which she previously worked. The judges learn that Dina
worked as an administrative assistant for a senior manager named
Peter before the agency fired her. While at the agency, Dina's
114. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 84, 92 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
115. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at
92.
116. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at
92.
117. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at
93.
118. The Linda problem can be criticized as methodologically flawed in that people might
be assuming that the single feature is actually meant to be the conjunction of "bank teller" and
"not active in the feminist movement." But Tversky and Kahneman have administered a version
in which they avoid this problem by changing the second response to "Linda is a bank teller
whether or not she is active in the feminist movement" and obtained similar results. Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 109, at 299.
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employment evaluations were "average" to "above average," so she
claimed her termination must have been motivated by unlawful
discrimination. The agency contends, instead, that it terminated Dina
because she repeatedly violated workplace rules and norms. Among
other things, she "took too many breaks during the workday and took
odd days off as holidays"; "dressed in ways that made her co-workers
and agency visitors feel uncomfortable, covering herself mostly in
black"; acted "odd" and "aloof"; and refused to eat lunch in the
presence of male coworkers.
Based solely on these facts, we asked the ALJs to rank-order the
likelihood of the following four options:
__
The agency unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on
her Islamic religious beliefs.
__
The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce.
__
The agency adhered to its internal employment policies.
-The
agency actively recruited a diverse workforce but also
unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic
religious beliefs.
Option four ("The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce
but also unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic
beliefs") is a conjunction of option one ("The agency unlawfully
discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic religious beliefs")
and option two ("The agency actively recruited a diverse
workforce"). Hence, option four is, as a matter of deductive logic, less
likely than either option one or option two. Nevertheless, we believed
that many judges would violate the conjunction rule by identifying
option four as more likely than either option one or option two (or
both).
As expected, we found that the ALJs violated the conjunction
rule. Rather than thinking through the problem deliberatively, which
would have led them to rank-order options one and two as more
likely than option four, we found the exact opposite. Of the ninetynine ALJs who responded to this problem, eighty-four (or 84.8
percent) violated the conjunction rule in some way. These eighty-four
judges committed all of the possible errors, albeit at different rates:
thirty-three rated the fourth option as either equally likely as, or more
likely than, both the first and second options;' 19thirty-six ranked the

119. Of these thirty-three judges, twenty ranked the fourth option as more likely than both
options one and two, eight wrote in that they were all equally likely, three assigned the same
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fourth option as either equally likely as, or more likely than, the first
option (but not the second option); 120 fifteen ranked the fourth option

as either equally likely as, or more likely than, the second option (but
not the first option). 12' Thus, the problem lured most judges into

committing the conjunction error, just as in the classic Linda
problem.
4. Hindsight/Outcome Bias. Psychologists have found that
people are vulnerable to the "hindsight bias," which is the tendency
for prior outcomes to seem more predictable than was actually the
case."' Once the outcome of an event is known, that outcome comes
to feel inevitable or at least much more likely to have occurred than it
would have seemed before it actually happened.

ranking to options one and two as option four, and two simply put a check mark next to option
four.
120. Of these thirty-six judges, one ranked the first and fourth options as equally likely.
121. Of these fifteen judges, seven ranked the first and fourth options as equally likely.
122. Although female judges were somewhat more likely to commit the conjunction error
than male judges (89 percent, or fifty out of fifty-six, versus 79 percent, or thirty-one out of
thirty-nine, respectively), this difference was not significant. Fisher's exact, p = .24. More
experienced judges tended to be more likely to commit the error than their younger
counterparts, but this trend was also not significant. Logistic regression of committing the error
on years of experience yielded a negative, but not significant, coefficient of -.048, z = 1.35, p =
.18. The error rate was also nearly identical among judges who make recommendations as
opposed to the other judges (86 percent, or thirty-six out of forty-two, versus 84 percent, or
forty-two out of fifty, respectively). This was not a significant difference. Fisher's exact, p = 1.00.
Previous work on the CRT has shown that people who score high on the CRT are less
likely to commit the conjunction error. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 5 ("Of our subjects in
the Low CRT group, 62.6% [committed the conjunction fallacy on the 'Linda' problem, but
t]his percentage is much lower for the High CRT group at 38.3% .... "). We found that among
the judges who scored perfectly on the CRT and answered this question, 72 percent (thirteen
out of eighteen) committed the fallacy, whereas 86 percent (sixty out of seventy) of the judges
who got at least one of the CRT questions wrong committed the fallacy. This difference was not,
however, significant. Fisher's exact, p = .29. The percentage who committed the conjunction
error broken down by exact CRT score is: zero right on CRT, 84 percent (twenty-five out of
thirty): one right on CRT, 86 percent (nineteen out of twenty-two); two right on CRT, 89
percent (sixteen out of eighteen); three right on CRT, 72 percent (thirteen out of eighteen). We
also ran a logistic regression of whether the judges committed the error based with CRT score
as a predictor, which also showed no significant effect. z = .72, p = .47. That we only observed a
trend might be due to a somewhat small sample size with which to identify the effect.
123. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 6 Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) ("Reporting an outcome's occurrence increases its perceived
probability of occurrence .... ).
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Outcome information can lead not only to the hindsight bias but
also to the "outcome bias.' ' 124 In contrast to the hindsight bias, which
posits that outcome information can affect probability judgments, the
outcome bias posits that people use outcome information to evaluate
the quality of the decision made. In short, "people take outcomes into
account in a way that is irrelevant to the true quality of the
decision. ' 2s
In previous work, we have found that judges are sometimes
prone to the hindsight bias 26 and sometimes not. 127 To explore
whether outcome information would influence ALJs, we gave the
ALJs attending the city conference a problem called the "Human
Rights Complaint.' ', 2 We asked the ALJs to imagine that they were
presiding over a pretrial hearing in which Malcolm Jones, a fourteenyear-old African-American boy, has filed a complaint against a large
toy store located in Midtown Manhattan alleging that he was harassed
and detained because of his race.
The ALJs learn that Jones was in the store one day with four
friends and that they were being loud, pushing and shoving, and
"playing around" inside the store. Jones claims that he wandered into
the video game section, played a little, and then was wrestled to the
floor roughly by a guard. The guard dragged him into a back room,
accused him of shoplifting, and according to Jones, subjected him to
several racial slurs.
At the hearing, the guard testified that he began watching the
group when they messed up the stuffed animals section of the store.
He reported that he kept a close eye on Jones, in particular. He
followed Jones and the other boys into the video game section and
claims that he thought he saw Jones lift a video game cartridge from a
countertop, prompting him to arrest Jones for shoplifting.

124.

Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) ("At issue here is whether there is an outcome

bias ...").
125. Id.
126. Guthrie et al., JudicialMind, supra note 8,at 799-803.
127. See Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1313-16 (finding no statistically significant
difference in judges' conclusions based on foresight as compared to their conclusions based on
hindsight).
128. Our study is similar to, and was inspired in part by, a study conducted by Professor
Jonathan Casper and his colleagues. See Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry,
JurorDecision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989).
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The guard admitted that among the five boys who came in
together, Jones was the only African-American (the others were
white), but denies that this made any difference to him. The guard
stated that "the kid just looked like trouble; it wasn't because he was
black."
We informed the ALJs that they were to issue a report on this
case, and we asked them to indicate whether they believed the store
did or did not discriminate against Jones because of his race.
Unbeknownst to the ALJs, we randomly assigned them to one of two
groups, each of which received different outcome information about
the alleged shoplifting. The ALJs in one group learned that "[t]he
game cartridge was, in fact, found inside Jones's coat. Jones claims he
intended to pay for it, even though he did not have enough money
with him to buy it." The ALJs in the other group learned that "[tihe
game cartridge was not, in fact, found on Jones. The guard claims 'he
must have ditched it somehow when he saw me coming."' The
outcome information we provided is arguably irrelevant to assessing
whether the store discriminated against Jones. In both instances,
there is conflicting evidence about the guard's behavior, about Jones's
behavior, and about their respective credibility as witnesses.
To be sure, the fact that Jones was found with a stolen game
cartridge in one version might undermine his credibility, and the
judges might sensibly fill in any perceived gaps in the story based on
their knowledge that Jones had the cartridge. But this is precisely how
the hindsight and outcome biases work-people fill in the details of
the story with their knowledge of the outcome." 9 This process might
be a reasonable one if the target actor (in this case the guard) had
known the details beforehand-in which case it is the outcome bias at
work. But people also tend to fill in more details than were actually
available to the target actor-in which case it is the hindsight bias at
work. Admittedly, this problem does not perfectly distinguish
between the hindsight bias and outcome bias, as a short problem will
invariably leave some detail to be filled in (a videotape of the events
from the guard's point of view would have been necessary to
demonstrate any difference to be the product of the hindsight bias
also). But we did identify the most salient facts of this situation for
the judges. And given the data on how robust and widespread the
129. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 584 (1998) ("[Pleople naturally integrate an outcome and the events that
preceded it into a coherent story.").
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hindsight bias is, 3 ' and how it can affect situations exactly like this
one, 31 we suggest that differences between the judgment in these two
conditions would be attributable in at least some degree to
improperly imputing insights to the guard that he could not
reasonably be expected to have had.
We found that the ALJs responded quite differently to the two
versions of this problem. Among the twenty-two judges who learned
that Jones was not shoplifting, 64 percent (fourteen) of the judges
determined that the guard had discriminated against Jones because of
his race, whereas only 29 percent (five) of the seventeen judges who
learned Jones was guilty made the same determination. This
difference is significant.'

130. Id. at 581 ("[Alcross a wide variety of tasks, materials, and populations, a sizeable and
consistent bias clouds judgments made in hindsight." (footnote omitted)).
131. See Casper et al., supra note 128, at 300 (reporting that subjects assessing a potential
civil rights violation displayed a "hindsight-bias-like process" in relying on outcome
information).
132. Fisher's exact test, p = .05.
Further analysis of gender, years of experience, and CRT score revealed some interesting
trends. Male judges expressed a stronger hindsight bias than their female counterparts. Among
the male judges, 71 percent (ten out of fourteen) of those who read about the innocent kid
concluded that the guard had discriminated, as compared to 13 percent (one out of eight) of
those who read about the guilty kid. By contrast, among the female judges, 50 percent (four out
of eight) who read about the innocent kid concluded that the guard had discriminated, as
compared to 44 percent (four out of nine) of the judges who read about the guilty kid. The
different reaction to the knowledge of the outcome between male and female judges was
marginally significant. Ordered logit of finding of discrimination on the condition, gender, and
interaction of condition and gender produced a marginal effect for the interaction. z = 1,69, p =
.09.
The more experience the judges had, the less that they were influenced by the outcome,
although this trend only approached significance. Ordered logit of finding of discrimination on
the condition, experience, and interaction of condition and experience produced a coefficient of
-.15, which was not significant. z = 1.55, p = .11. An effect of experience here is consistent with
previous research on the hindsight bias, which demonstrates smaller effects among people with
greater knowledge. See Jay J.J. Chistensen-Szalansky & Cynthia Fobian Williams, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
147, 162 (1991) ("[Hindsight] effects are further reduced when the subject is familiar with the
task, i.e., has expertise in or experience with the task.").
The CRT score did not appear to influence the judges' judgment on this task. Ordered
logit of finding of discrimination on the condition, CRT score, and interaction of condition and
CRT produced no significant interaction. z = .50, p = .62. Because there is no finding that CRT
score influences the hindsight bias, this was not surprising.
Because eleven of the judges identified themselves as primarily responsible for employee
discipline (nine judges) or discrimination (two judges) cases, we tried to assess whether these
judges behaved differently than the other judges who did not have such experience. Among the
judges with no experience in this area, 71 percent (ten out of fourteen) of those who read about
the innocent kid concluded that the guard had discriminated, as compared to 31 percent (four
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5. Disregarding. People have great difficulty deliberately
disregarding salient information. " 3 In one classic illustration,
researchers asked subjects participating in an elaborate experiment
"not to think of a white bear."'' 4 The subjects had great difficulty
carrying out this seemingly simple task. In fact, they reported thinking
about a white bear more when instructed
not to do so than when they
13 5
instruction.
an
such
given
not
were
In previous work, we have found that generalist judges have
difficulty deliberately disregarding relevant but inadmissible evidence
when making decisions, but that they can overcome their intuitive
responses in some instances. 36' To explore whether ALJs might be
similarly influenced, we gave the ALJs attending the national
conference a problem called "The Alleged Rats."'3 7
We asked the ALJs to imagine that they were presiding over a
case brought by the Department of Health against a Cafd for alleged
health code violations involving a reported rat infestation. The ALJs
learned that the city's Health Department sent an inspector to the
restaurant after neighbors complained of a rat infestation in the Caf6
and the alleyway behind it. The inspector visited the site and found
two large rat traps in the basement of the Caf6 and an empty box of
rat poison. He also took statements from a neighbor who indicated
that he had complained about the rats, but that the Cafe's owner had
refused to do anything about it. The neighbor asserted that he had
out of thirteen) of those who read about the guilty kid. By contrast, among the judges with
experience, 57 percent (four out of seven) who read about the innocent kid concluded that the
guard had discriminated, as compared to 50 percent (one out of two) of the judges who read
about the guilty kid. This suggests that experience might induce deliberative decisionmaking,
but because only two experienced judges read about the guilty kid, the results cannot be
interpreted as anything more than suggesting that experience aids judges' ability to avoid the
hindsight and outcome bias.
133. See Jonathan M. Golding & Debra L. Long, There's More to Intentional Forgettingthan
Directed Forgetting:An IntegrativeReview, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY

APPROACHES 59, 93 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod eds., 1998) (reviewing
theoretical accounts of this phenomenon); Hollyn M. Johnson, Processes of Successful
Intentional Forgetting, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 274, 274 (1994) ("[The] success of intentional
forgetting depends on how one originally encoded the to-be-forgotten information .... ").
134. Daniel M. Wegner et al., Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6-7 (1987).
135. Id. at 7.
136. See Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1323-23 (concluding that although judges "do not
disregard inadmissible information" in all cases, they are able to do so in some circumstances).
137. We pilot tested a version of this problem with ALJs at the city conference and made
some adjustments to the context of the problem in light of recommendations from some of the
judges in attendance.
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seen the rats almost daily. Based on this evidence, the inspector cited
the Caf6 for a violation of the City's Health Code.
We informed the ALJs that the inspector and complaining
neighbor testified to the facts above and that the neighbor also
reported that he had a friend who had seen rats there. The Caf6
owner, by contrast, denied that there was a rat problem.
The ALJs learn that per the Health Code the Health
Department has the burden of proving that a violation of the Health
Code occurred. They also learn that if they find that the restaurant
violated the Health Code, they can impose a fine of up to $2,000.
We divided the ALJs into three groups: a control group and two
experimental groups. The ALJs in the control group received no
additional information. The ALJs in the two experimental groups
learned that the neighbor produced "a photo of rats on the floor of
the kitchen, which he contends was taken by his friend" while his
friend was visiting. The Caf6 owner denies that the photograph
depicts his kitchen, and the Caf6 owner's lawyer moves to exclude it
as improperly authenticated. We provided this additional information
to the ALJs in both experimental groups, but for one of the groups
we also included a copy of the photograph, showing two rats running
along a floor.
We then asked the ALJs in both experimental groups how they
would rule on the Caf6 owner's motion to exclude the evidence.
Finally, we compared the fines levied by the control group ALJs to
the fines levied by the ALJs in the experimental groups who granted
the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence. Even though these
judges indicated by their rulings that they deemed the evidence
irrelevant to their decisionmaking, we hypothesized that this
information would nonetheless influence the fines they set in the case,
particularly for those ALJs exposed to the highly salient photograph
of the rats. In short, we expected that the control group ALJs would
levy the lowest fines, the experimental group ALJs not exposed to the
photograph would levy slightly higher fines, and the experimental
group ALJs exposed to the photograph would levy the highest fines.
We found that the inadmissible evidence in this case had only
limited influence on the ALJs. That is, the results reveal some trends,
but no significant effects. A greater percentage of the judges who saw
the photograph (85 percent, or twenty-three out of twenty-seven)
than who read about it (71 percent, or twenty-two out of thirty-one)
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excluded it, but this difference was not significant. 3 s The judges who
saw the photograph of the rats seemed to award higher fines. The
average fine among the thirty-nine judges who did not see the
photograph was $646, as opposed to $566 among the judges who read
about (and excluded) the photograph, and $967 among the judges
who saw the photograph (and excluded it).'39 The awards were highly
erratic, however, with many judges choosing to impose no fine ($0),
and others imposing the maximum $2,000 fine, as Table 4 below
reports. Accordingly, the apparent differences between the three
versions were not significant. 4 °
Table 4. Fines by Condition in the Evidence SuppressionProblem
Condition

Percent

Average

Percent

Percent Imposing

Percent

(and Sample

Suppressing

Fine ($)*

Imposing

>$0, but <$2000

Imposing

Size)

Evidence

No rats (39)

-

646

51

26

23

Read about

71

566

50

32

18

85

967

35

35

30

$0 fine

$2000 Fine

Rats (31)
Saw Photo of
Rats (27)

1

1
* Excluding those who admitted the testimony 14

6. EgocentricBias. Psychologists have found that people tend to
make judgments about themselves, their abilities, and their beliefs
that are egocentric or self-serving. People routinely estimate, for
example, that they are well above average on characteristics that are
138. Fisher's exact test, p = .22.
139. Six judges did not provide complete responses: one judge in the condition without the
evidence gave no award; one judge who read about the photo ruled it inadmissible, but gave no
award; one judge (in the third condition) refused to rule or award; one judge who saw the photo
ruled it admissible but gave no award; two judges who saw the photo ruled it inadmissible but
gave no award.
140. A tobit regression of the award on two dummy-coded variables to reflect the three
conditions did not produce a significant effects for the regression (p < .33) or for either of the
dummy codes (for exposure to the evidence versus the control condition, t =.22, p =.83, for
exposure to the photo versus the other two conditions, t = 1.32,p = .19).
141. Among the nine judges who read about the photo of the rats and admitted the
testimony, three chose the maximum fine, three chose fines between $0 and $2,000 (specifically,
$400, $500, and $1500), and three chose no fine ($0); the average fine was $933. Among the four
judges who saw the photo of the rats and admitted the testimony, two chose the maximum fine
and two chose no fine ($0), yielding an average of $1,000.
142. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, EgocentricBiases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 333 (1979) ("[Tlhe egocentric biases in availability and
attribution appear to be robust and pervasive.").
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important to them, such as their health,143 the 1likely
duration of their
46
14
marriage," their driving ability, and so forth.
In previous work, we have found that generalist judges evaluate
themselves in self-serving or egocentric ways.' 7 To explore whether
ALJs might be prone to self-serving bias, we asked the ALJs
attending the city conference to compare themselves to the other
attendees on three dimensions: their ability to assess the credibility of
a witness, their ability to avoid bias, and their ability to facilitate
settlements. With regard to each, we asked the judges to place
themselves into one of four quartiles: the top 25 percent, the next 25
percent, the next 25 percent, or the bottom 25 percent.
The ALJs provided self-serving interpretations of their skills, as
Table 5 shows. With regard to assessing the credibility of witnesses,
83.3 percent of the ALJs placed themselves in the top half;
specifically, 25 percent placed themselves in the top quartile and 58.3
percent placed themselves in the second quartile. Not a single ALJ
placed herself in the bottom quartile. The ALJs were nearly as
sanguine about their ability to facilitate settlements, as 86.2 percent
placed themselves in the top half (30.6 percent placed themselves in
the top quartile and 55.6 percent placed themselves in the second
quartile). When it came to their capacity for avoiding bias in judging,
a whopping 97.2 percent of the ALJs placed themselves in the top
half-that is, 50 percent placed themselves in the top quartile and
47.2 percent placed themselves in the second quartile. Again, not a
single ALJ placed herself in the bottom quartile. Although only 50
percent of the ALJs can be in the top half of their peers in these three
M

143. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-11 (1980).
144. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptionsand Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
441-43 (1993).
145. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145-46 (1981).
146. But see Don A. Moore & Deborah A. Small, Errorand Bias in ComparativeJudgment:
On Being Both Better and Worse than We Think We Are, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
972, 973-74 (2007) (arguing that self-serving responses are often reasonable ones given the
subjects' ignorance about how others perform on such tasks).
147. Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 813-14.
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components of their
judicial behavior, most of the ALJs rated
14 s
themselves this way.

Table 5: Self-Serving Assessments of JudicialSkills
Skill
(and sample size)

Percent in each Quartile
Better
Better than

Evaluating Credibility (36)
Facilitating Settlement (36)
Avoiding Prejudice (36)

Better than

Worse

than 75%

50%, worse
than top 25%

25%, worse
than top 50%

than 75%

25
31
50

58
56
47

17
8
3

0
6
0

D. Summary
Even though they specialize in particular areas of law, face
greater accountability, and get more feedback than their generalist
148. The distribution of these results departs significantly from what one would expect if
there were no bias: Evaluating credibility, X'(3) = 26.0, p < .001; facilitating settlement,
X-(3) = 24.2, p < .001; avoiding prejudice, x2(3) = 32.2, p < .001.
Further analysis revealed that female judges made assessments that were somewhat more
self-serving than male judges as to some of their abilities. Female judges made somewhat more
self-serving assessments of their abilities to assess witness credibility than male judges (76
percent, or sixteen out of twenty-one male judges, versus 93 percent, or fourteen out of fifteen
female judges), but an ordered logit regression of the rating against gender revealed that this
tendency was not significant. z = 1.42, p = .16. Female judges, however, rated their abilities to
facilitate settlement high; whereas 76 percent (sixteen out of twenty-one) of the male judges
rated themselves as better than the median judge, all fifteen female judges did so. An ordered
logit regression of the rating against gender revealed that this difference was a marginally
significant effect. z = 1.71, p = .09. Male and female judges made roughly equally self-serving
assessments of their ability to avoid bias (the only judge to rate himself below the median was a
male judge). An ordered logit regression of the rating against gender revealed no significant
effect. z = .46, p = .64.
CRT score also affected the self-serving bias. Judges who scored high on the CRT made
somewhat more modest assessments of their abilities to evaluate witness credibility. An ordered
logit regression of the rating against CRT score revealed that this tendency was a marginally
significant effect. z =1.69, p = .09. CRT score did not correlate with the judges' assessments of
their abilities to facilitate settlement. An ordered logit regression of the rating against gender
revealed that this difference was a marginally significant effect. z = .46, p = .64. But judges who
scored high on the CRT made more modest assessments of their abilities to avoid prejudice. An
ordered logit regression of the rating against CRT score revealed that this tendency was a
significant effect. z = 2.01, p < .05. These results are consistent with previous work showing that
those who do well on the CRT also tend to avoid self-serving assessments. Oechssler et al.,
supra note 79, at 6 ("The fraction of subjects who judge their performance in the CRT correctly
is dramatically higher for the High CRT group at 67.8% than for the Low group (9.7%).").
Years of experience did not correlate with the judges' self-serving tendencies on any of
the three assessments. An ordered logit regression of the experience against each of the three
evaluations revealed no significant effects: Evaluate witnesses, z = .45, p = .65; avoid prejudice.,
z = .48, p = .63; facilitate settlement, z = .23, p = .82.
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colleagues, ALJs do not seem that different from the hundreds of
generalist trial judges that we have studied. They performed similarly
on both the CRT and on the judicial decisionmaking tasks.
These results suggest that our intuitive-override model of judging
is applicable not only to generalist trial judges but also to ALJs. Both
kinds of judges gravitate toward intuitive judgment on generic
judgment problems and prove generally susceptible to the heuristics
and biases that tend to induce intuitive and impressionistic judgments
in judicial-decisionmaking problems. The data suggest that ALJsdespite their subject-matter expertise, high degree of accountability,
and receipt of regular feedback-are predominantly intuitive
decisionmakers, not unlike their counterparts in generalist
courtrooms around the country. We found no evidence that judges
who make recommendations (and hence are subject to greater
feedback and accountability) react any differently to the problems we
presented than their counterparts who are subject only to appeals.
We also found no direct evidence that judges who are experienced in
the areas that we studied were any more likely to rely on deliberation
than those judges who were facing unfamiliar problems.149 That said, it
is worth noting that the ALJs were quite resistant to the influence of
the photograph of rats in a context that was similar to the kinds of
cases over which many of them preside, which is encouraging. We
also found some limited evidence suggesting that expertise might
facilitate better judgment. Specifically, we found that the judges with
greater experience were slightly less vulnerable to the hindsight
bias.'50
It is also worth noting that we found that high-CRT judges were
better at avoiding some of the errors in judgment than low-CRT
149. To be sure, our exploration of the impact of specialization on ALJ decisionmaking was
imperfect. We tested two different samples of judges who spend most of their time in a wide
variety of highly specialized areas. Because we could not easily anticipate what these specialties
would be in advance of collecting the data and did not anticipate the degree of variation, our
scenarios only infrequently and sporadically present fact patterns that match the specialty of the
judges. Our scenarios for the New York judges (our first sample) included housing and
discrimination issues, but we only had two judges who oversee housing cases and nine judges
who address discrimination. In preparing for the study of national judges, we hoped to capitalize
on the number of judges who addressed discrimination by using two scenarios involving
discrimination, but the national sample included only four such judges. We also anticipated that
a number of judges would identify themselves as addressing health, safety, sanitation, or
environmental issues. This was true for both samples, but in the case of the New York judges,
our materials were unusable, and in the national sample, we did not observe any effect that
might vary by experience.
150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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judges; specifically, high-CRT judges were less egocentric.5' and were
slightly (but not statistically significantly) less likely to commit the
conjunction fallacy. 52 But our data do not suggest that simply hiring
high-CRT judges would be a panacea for good judgment. In most
contexts, judges who scored well on the CRT were just as likely to
rely on misleading heuristics as those who did not.
CONCLUSION

The role that ALJs play in the judicial process has been a matter
of great debate since the inception of the ALJ position. During the
second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twentyfirst century, ALJs and their agency superiors have engaged in an
ongoing tug-of-war over the issue of ALJ authority and
independence. Initially, the vast majority of ALJs were embedded in
one agency or another. But they have steadily become more
independent. Today, roughly 60 percent of American states house
ALJs in a central panel, in which they act much more like generalist
trial judges and are separated from the agencies whose disputes they
adjudicate. 53 Nevertheless, agencies generally enjoy expansive review
over AU
decisions, with no obligation to defer even to ALJ fact
1 14
finding.
In this Article, we make two contributions to this debate. First,
we find no meaningful differences in the quality of AL
decisionmaking, regardless of the degree of independence that ALJs
appear to enjoy in their present positions. That is, ALJs appear to
make decisions in much the same way, whether they work solely for
one agency, work in a central panel jurisdiction, or enjoy some other
employment arrangement. This suggests that judicial independence,
though valuable for other reasons, ' may not have much, if any,
bearing on the quality of the justice ALJs actually dispense.
Second, our work suggests that ALJs, like generalist judges, are
likely to make mostly intuitive decisions. The intuitive approach is

151. See supra note 148.
152. See supra note 122.
153. See supra note 29.
154. See supra note 39.
155. See, e.g., Christopher B. McNeil, Perceptions of Fairness in State Administrative
Hearings, 92 JUDICATURE 160, 162 (2009) (reporting that citizens find some central panel
adjudications more fair than within-agency adjudications).
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quick, effortless, spontaneous, and often accurate. 56 As Professors
Tversky and Kahneman observed in their early exploration of
decisionmaking, intuitive thinking is "quite useful" and can often lead
to accurate decisionmaking.157 That said, intuition can also lead
decisionmakers astray. Again, as Tversky and Kahneman observed,
intuitive thinking can "lead to severe and systematic errors. '158 In this
Article, we found that ALJs relying on intuitive processing allowed
an irrelevant anchor to influence compensatory damage awards; the
framing of payment options to influence evaluations of the
appropriateness of a landlord's conduct; and the representativeness of
a piece of information to influence evaluations of the likelihood of a
defendant employer's conduct. In these instances, the judges made
erroneous judgments that they might have avoided by adopting a
deliberative decisionmaking approach.
Combining these two observations-that
ALJs make
predominantly intuitive decisions regardless of their formal
independence from the agencies whose disputes they adjudicate-we
conclude that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the more
vexing challenge facing executive branch judges. There are sound
reasons to worry about independence, but the executive branch-like
the judiciary-should also worry about minimizing, channeling, and
improving judicial intuition. Perhaps more than any other reform, this
will enhance justice for litigants.

156.
157.
158.

See supra text accompanying note 18.
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10, at 1124.
Id.
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APPENDIX A: MATERIALS USED AT THE
NEW YORK CITY CONFERENCE

This appendix presents the text of the two hypothetical cases
that we report in this paper that we used at the New York City
conference, with variations noted in brackets. We also present the
"skills assessment" question and the demographic questions asked at
this conference.
Nonpayment Case
Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent.
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is
[$2,000/$2,100], but the landlord imposes a $50 per month
[surcharge/discount] if the tenant chooses to pay by credit card. Do
you think this is fair?
_
Completely fair
Acceptable
Unfair
Very Unfair
Human Rights Complaint
Suppose you are presiding over a pre-trial hearing involving the
New York City Human Rights Law. Malcolm Jones, a fourteen-year
old African-American boy, has filed a complaint against a large toy
store in Midtown Manhattan. Jones alleges that he was harassed and
detained by the store because of his race.
The hearing revealed that Jones was in the store one day with
several friends. By his own admission, he and four friends were being
loud, pushing and shoving, and "playing around" inside the store. He
admitted that they had made a mess of the stuffed animal section.
Jones claimed they moved on to play some of the video games that
the store makes available for customers. Jones claims that he
wandered around in the section, played a little, and then was wrestled
to the floor roughly and handcuffed by a guard. The guard dragged
him into a back room and accused him of shoplifting. Jones and two
of his friends contend that the guard used several racial slurs.
At the hearing, a guard testified that he began watching "that
little pack" when they messed up the stuffed animals. "I kept a close
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eye on that one especially", as he pointed to Jones. He stated that he
followed the boys into the video game section to keep an eye on
them. He stated that a small game cartridge had been placed
temporarily by a clerk onto a countertop, and that "that punk spotted
it right away." The guard claimed that he saw Jones ease over to the
countertop, and when he walked away, "the cartridge was gone." The
guard then arrested Jones for shoplifting.
The guard admitted that among the five boys who came in
together, Jones was the only African-American (the others were
white), but denies that this made any difference to him. The guard
stated, "that kid looked like trouble; it wasn't because he was black."
The game cartridge was, in fact, [found inside Jones' coat/not
found on Jones]. [Jones claims he intended to pay for it, even though
he did not have enough money with him to buy it./ The guard claims
"he must have ditched it somehow when he saw me coming."]
You must issue a report in which you conclude whether the store
likely discriminated against Jones because of his race, or not. Given
these facts, what is your opinion?
__Yes, Jones was likely discriminated against because of his
race
No, Jones was likely not discriminated against because of his
race
Skills Self-Assessment
Relative to the other judges attending this conference, how
would you rate yourself on the following:
Assessing the credibility of a witness
In the highest quartile (meaning that you are more skilled at
this than 75% of the judges attending this conference)
In the second highest quartile (meaning that you are more
skilled at this than 50% of the judges in this room, but less
skilled than 25 % of the judges attending this conference)
In the second lowest quartile (meaning that you are more
skilled at this than 25% of the judges in this room, but less
skilled than 50% of the judges attending this conference)
In the lowest quartile (meaning that you are less skilled at
this than 75% of the judges attending this conference)
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[Note that we also used the same 4 categories for the three skills
listed below:]
Avoiding racial bias in making decisions
Facilitating settlements
DemographicInformation
Please identify your gender:
____male
female
years
For how many years have you served as a judge?
What type of cases do you normally hear?
Which of the two major political parties in the United States
most closely matches your own political beliefs?
The Republican Party
The Democratic Party
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B: MATERIALS USED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

This appendix presents the text of the three hypothetical cases
that we report in this paper that we used at the New York City
conference, with variations noted in brackets. We used the same
demographic questions as in the New York City Conference.
Employment Case
Imagine that you are presiding in a case involving an
employment dispute between Dina El Saba, a public sector employee,
and the agency for which she previously worked. Dina was an
administrative assistant for a senior manager named Peter before the
agency terminated her employment. At the agency, her employment
evaluations were all "average" to "above-average," so she contends
her termination was motivated by unlawful discrimination. Peter
concedes that Dina's performance evaluations were as she claims, but
he reports that the agency terminated her for repeatedly violating
workplace rules and norms. Among other things, Dina took too many
breaks during the workday and took odd days off as holidays. He also
claims she dressed in ways that made her coworkers and agency
visitors feel uncomfortable, covering herself mostly in black. He also
contends that she acted "odd" and "aloof", refusing to eat lunch while
male coworkers were present in the break room.
Based solely on these facts, how likely is it that: (Please rank
these in order of likelihood, where "1" is the most likely, "2" is the
second-most likely, "3" is the third-most likely, and "4" is the least
likely.)
_____The agency unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on
her Islamic religious beliefs.
_____The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce.
_____The agency adhered to its internal employment policies.
_____The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce but also
unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic
religious beliefs.
Veronica v. AAC
Imagine that you are presiding over an employment
discrimination case brought by the City Commission on Human
Rights ("Commission") on behalf of Veronica Sanchez, a Mexican-
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American who legally immigrated to the U.S., against Administrative
Assistants on Call, LLC. ("AAC"). The Commission alleges that
AAC violated the Administrative Code by terminating Veronica
based on her "actual or perceived" race, color, national origin, and
alienage or citizenship status.
AAC enters into contracts with small businesses to provide offsite secretarial and administrative support services. Until six months
ago, Veronica was one of AAC's top employees. Six months ago,
however, AAC hired a new manager, and according to Veronica, he
immediately gave her only undesirable projects. Veronica testified
that he used racially offensive terms in her presence; told her on a
couple of occasions to "go back to Mexico"; and accused her of taking
jobs from "real Americans." On one occasion, he made comments
like these in front of one of Veronica's former coworkers, who
corroborated Veronica's testimony, and in front of Veronica's
daughter, who was visiting her at work that day. Veronica complained
to the manager, who then fired her.
AAC does not deny Veronica's allegations, but AAC contests
the Commission's request for damages on Veronica's behalf. AAC's
owner testified that the company eventually fired the manager and
noted that Veronica found comparable employment shortly after her
termination, and she therefore does not even make a claim for lost
wages.
The Commission seeks compensatory damages on Veronica's
behalf. Under the Administrative Code, you are authorized to award
compensatory damages for "mental anguish," and controlling case
law indicates that an award is justified where "there is credible
evidence of some degree of emotional distress." Here, Veronica
testified credibly that she has suffered from anxiety, sleeplessness,
and bad dreams. She also mentioned as an aside that she recently saw
a case similar to hers on a "court television show" where the plaintiff
received a [$415,300] compensatory damage award for mental
anguish.
Commission practice gives you broad discretion, [and experience
indicates that review of your award by the Commission's appellate
panel is extremely unlikely/ but experience indicates that review of
your award and your explanation by the Commission's appellate
panel is very likely.]
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Based solely on these facts, what compensatory damages would
you award Veronica for mental anguish?
Please briefly explain the basis for your damage award:

The Restaurant
Imagine that you are presiding over a case brought by the
Department of Health against a restaurant called Caf6 Des Artists for
an alleged Health Code violation.
The source of the complaint is a citation against the Caf6 for an
alleged rat problem. The City Health Department sent an inspector
to the restaurant after neighbors complained of a rat infestation in the
Caf6 and the alleyway behind it. The inspector visited the site and
found two large rat traps in the basement of the Caf6 and an empty
box of rat poison. He also took statements from a neighbor who
indicated that he had complained about the rats, but that the Caff's
owner has refused to do anything about it. The neighbor asserted that
he had seen the rats almost daily, mostly "coming out of the kitchen".
Based on this evidence, the inspector cited the Caf6 for a violation of
the City's Health Code.
Both the neighbor and the inspector testified at the hearing. The
inspector restated the facts above. The neighbor added that he has a
friend who also saw rats when he visited from out of town, but this
friend was not available to testify. [He produced a photo of rats on
the floor of the kitchen (see below), which he contends was taken by
his friend through an open door of the restaurant's kitchen. He claims
the friend sent him the photo by e-mail.]
At the hearing, the Cafe's owner denied that there are rats in his
restaurant. He claims he has seen no rats in the restaurant and that he
has received no complaints from the neighbors. He asserts that the
traps and empty box of poison must have been left there by a
previous owner before he took over the restaurant a year ago. [He
denies that the photo was taken in the restaurant. At the hearing his
lawyer objected to the use of the photo as lacking sufficient
authentication and moved that it be excluded.]
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)uld you rule on the motion to exclude the photograph?
y the motion and admit the photograph into evidence
nt the motion and exclude the photograph from
ence]
Ith Codes specifies that the Health Department has the
monstrating that a violation occurred. If you find that a
irred, then you may levy a fine of up to $2,000.
olely on the evidence admitted at the hearing, what fine,
you impose on the Caf6 owner?
Tho pht)fw
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